Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges should be able to Participate in Plea Discussions by Miller, Colin
Boston College Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 4 Article 5
9-27-2013
Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests
that Judges should be able to Participate in Plea
Discussions
Colin Miller
University of South Carolina School of Law, Mille933@law.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges should be able to Participate
in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C.L. Rev. 1667 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss4/
5
1667 
ANCHORS AWAY: WHY THE ANCHORING 
EFFECT SUGGESTS THAT JUDGES  
SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE  
IN PLEA DISCUSSIONS 
Colin Miller* 
Abstract: The “anchoring effect” is a cognitive bias by which people evalu-
ate numbers by focusing on a reference point—an anchor—and adjusting 
up or down. Unfortunately, people usually do not sufficiently adjust away 
from their anchors, so the initial choice of anchors has an inordinate ef-
fect on their final estimates. More than ninety percent of all criminal cases 
are resolved by plea bargains. In the vast majority of those cases, the prose-
cutor makes the initial plea offer, and prosecutors often make high initial 
offers. Assuming that the prosecutor’s opening offer operates as an an-
chor, nearly all criminal caes in this country produce unjust results based 
upon an unconscious cognitive bias. This Article proposes a solution that 
most jurisdictions have rejected: Judges should be able to participate in 
the plea discussions. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) and 
most state counterparts strictly preclude judges from participating in plea 
discussions, but a few jurisdictions permit judicial participation. In these 
jurisdictions, plea discussions commence with the prosecution and defense 
laying out their cases and asking for particular dispositions and the judge 
responding with the expected post-plea sentence. This Article contends 
that this type of judicial participation would reduce the anchoring effect. 
Introduction 
 Thirty-eight pairs of MBA students at Northwestern University par-
ticipated in a mock negotiation.1 Researchers designated one student 
in each pair the seller and the other student the buyer.2 The research-
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1 Adam D. Galinsky & Thomas Mussweiler, First Offers as Anchors: The Role of Perspective-
Taking and Negotiator Focus, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 657, 660 (2001). 
2 See id. 
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ers told each student that the negotiation would involve the sale of a 
pharmaceutical plant.3 They also told all the students several other facts 
about the prospective sale: (1) the seller purchased the plant three 
years ago for $15 million, which was below the market price because 
the previous seller was in bankruptcy; (2) two years ago, the plant was 
appraised at $19 million; (3) in the last two years, the real estate market 
declined five percent, though the plant was unique and possibly im-
mune to the decline; and (4) a similar plant sold nine months ago for 
$26 million.4 
 The researchers informed the buyer-students that they were CFOs 
of a company in need of a new plant to manufacture highly specialized 
compounds.5 The researchers also told the buyers that their best alter-
native to purchasing the seller’s plant was to spend $25 million on 
building a new plant.6 Meanwhile, the researchers told the seller-
students that they were selling the plant because their company was 
phasing out the product that the plant produced.7 The researchers 
then told the sellers that their best alternative was to strip the plant and 
sell the equipment for a projected profit of $17 million.8 The major 
variable was that the researchers told half of the pairs that the seller 
must make the first offer and the other half of the pairs that the buyer 
must make the first offer.9 
 The result? In every pair, the students reached an agreement.10 
When seller-students made the opening offer, they first offered to sell 
the plant for an average of $26.6 million; when buyer-students made 
the initial offer, they first offered to buy the plant for an average of 
$16.5 million.11 When the opening offer was an offer to sell by a seller-
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 660, 669. 
5 Id. at 660. 
6 Id. Although the new plant would be closer to the company’s headquarters, it would 
take a year to build. Id. The researchers thought it important to note that the cost of build-
ing the new plant was close to the $26 million price of the comparable plant that sold nine 
months earlier. Id. at 660, 669. 
7 Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 1, at 660. 
8 Id. at 661. The researchers thought it important to note that the profit generated by 
stripping the plant was close to the $15 million price that the sellers paid for the plant 
three years ago. Id. The researches also noted that the projected $17 million in profit was 
only $2 million less than the appraisal value of the plant. Id. 
9 Id. Another variable was that the researchers gave a quarter of the negotiators—half 
of those in the secondary offer position—a page of information instructing them to think 
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student, the average final purchase price was $24.8 million.12 When a 
buyer-student opened the bidding, the average final purchase price was 
$19.7 million.13 
 This $5.1 million difference in average final purchase price can be 
explained by the “anchoring effect” —an unconscious cognitive bias by 
which “[p]eople come up with or evaluate numbers by focusing on a 
reference point (an anchor) and then adjusting up or down from that 
anchor.”14 In the Northwestern study, the opening offer was the anchor, 
and the problem for the students not making that offer was that people 
typically do not veer much from their anchors.15 This meant that the 
choice of the initial anchors had an inordinate effect on the students’ 
final purchase prices.16 
 Many legal bargaining theorists now recognize anchoring as a ba-
sic truth of civil negotiations,17 and it seems safe to assume that this 
same cognitive bias applies to criminal negotiations as well. For exam-
ple, Professor Stephanos Bibas has argued: 
The same dynamics [present in civil negotiations] help to ex-
plain the course of plea bargaining. For example, a prosecu-
tor might initially offer a robbery defendant twenty years’ im-
prisonment by piling on every plausible enhancement. The 
defendant, of course, rejects this unreasonable offer out of 
hand, but the initial offer serves as a high anchor. When the 
prosecutor comes back with a revised offer of fifteen years, 
that offer sounds more reasonable. By the time the prosecutor 
comes down to twelve years, the defendant is ready to jump at 
the deal. If the prosecutor had started out at twelve years, 
                                                                                                                      
12 Id. 
13 Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 1, at 661. 
14 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 
2515 (2004); see Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 1, at 658–59, 662; see also Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 
(1974) (explaining the anchoring effect). 
15 Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 1, at 660–61; see also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2516. 
16 Galinsky & Mussweiler, supra note 1, at 660–61; see also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2516. 
17 See Robert J. Condlin, Legal Bargaining Theory’s New “Prospecting” Agenda: It May Be So-
cial Science, But Is It News?, 10 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 215, 247 (2010) (“[A]nchoring is en-
demic to dispute settlement generally . . . .”); Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Informa-
tion, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 
597, 609 (2006) (“Several studies have found evidence that anchors of various kinds—
including opening offers/demands, statutory damage caps, insurance policy limits, nego-
tiator aspirations, and so forth—can have an effect on both settlements and deals.”); see 
also Bibas, supra note 14, at 2517 (discussing how a plaintiff’s lawyer may use implausibly 
large damage requests to create a high anchor and increase the ultimate jury award). 
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however, the defendant might have anchored on that number 
as the highest likely sentence and rejected it as a bad deal.18 
 More than ninety percent of all criminal cases in this country are 
resolved by plea bargains.19 In the majority of those cases, the prosecu-
tor makes the initial plea offer,20 which is typically high.21 Assuming 
that the anchoring effect applies to criminal negotiations in the same 
way that it applies to civil negotiations, this would mean that nearly 
every criminal case in this country is resolved on the basis of an uncon-
scious cognitive bias. 
 This Article proposes a solution to this problem, which the vast 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States have rejected: Judges 
should be able to participate in plea discussions. Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) and most state counterparts strictly pro-
hibit judges from participating in plea discussions,22 but a few jurisdic-
tions, such as Florida and Connecticut, permit judicial participation.23 
In these jurisdictions, plea discussions typically commence with the 
                                                                                                                      
18 Bibas, supra note 14, at 2517–18. 
19 Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langan, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 1994, 
Bureau of Just. Stats. 3 (Mar. 1998), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scscf94.pdf. 
In 1996, plea bargains resolved ninety-one percent of convictions. David J. Levin, Patrick A. 
Langan & Jodi M. Brown, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 1996, Bureau of Just. 
Stats. 50 (Feb. 2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scscf96.pdf. In 2004, plea 
bargains resolved ninety-five percent of convictions. State Court Sentencing of Convicted Fel-
ons, 2004—Statistical Tables, Bureau Just. Stats., at tbl. 4.1, http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04401tab.cfm (last revised July 28, 2013). 
20 Justin H. Dion, Note, Criminal Law—Prosecutorial Discretion or Contract Theory Restric-
tions?—The Implications of Allowing Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion Founded on Under-
lying Contract Principles, 22 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 149, 160 (2000) (“Once the prosecutor 
decides that a plea agreement could benefit the government, the prosecutor will usually 
make the initial offer to the defendant.”). 
21 Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations: “Voluntary” Waivers of 
Constitutional Rights, Crim. Just., Fall 2008, at 14, 21. 
22 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and the defendant’s at-
torney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agree-
ment. The court must not participate in these discussions.”); David A. Sklansky & Stephen 
C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal 
Procedure and Vice Versa, 94 Geo. L.J. 683, 700 n.59 (2006) (“Most state rules mirror the 
federal rule in this respect, but a growing minority of states allow and even encourage 
judges to participate in plea negotiations.”); see, e.g., Colo. R. Crim. P. 11(f)(4) (“The trial 
judge shall not participate in plea discussions.”); Miss. Unif. R. Cir. & Cnty. Court Prac. 
8.04(B)(4) (“The trial judge shall not participate in any plea discussion.”); Tenn. R. Crim. 
P. 11(c)(1) (“The court shall not participate in these discussions.”); Wyo. R. Crim. P. 
11(e)(1)(C) (“The court shall not participate in any such discussions.”). 
23 See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.171(d) (permitting judicial participation in plea discussions); 
State v. Revelo, 775 A.2d 260, 268 (Conn. 2001) (same); infra notes 160–179 and accom-
panying text. 
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prosecutor and defense counsel laying out their cases and asking for 
particular dispositions.24 The judge then facilitates future negotiations 
by responding with the expected post-plea sentence in the form of a 
sentence cap, a sentencing range, or a fixed sentence.25 
 This Article contends that this type of judicial participation re-
duces the anchoring effect because the expected post-plea sentence 
communicated by the judge replaces the prosecutor’s opening offer as 
the anchor, producing a fairer plea-bargaining process. Such judicial 
participation in plea discussions ameliorates many of the problems cur-
rently associated with the plea-bargaining system and can be conducted 
in a way that avoids many of the pitfalls that have prevented most juris-
dictions from allowing such action. 
 Part I of this Article sets forth the problems with the current plea-
bargaining process, beginning with the caveat accused approach courts 
have taken with regard to plea bargaining and ending with the tooth-
less judicial review of plea agreements.26 Part II describes the ways in 
which jurisdictions such as Florida and Connecticut allow judges to par-
ticipate in the plea-bargaining process.27 Part III defines the anchoring 
effect and explains both how the cognitive bias is created and how it 
distorts the way in which civil parties engage in negotiations.28 Part IV 
details why the anchoring effect likely distorts the decision making of 
criminal defendants during plea bargaining and concludes that judicial 
participation during plea discussions would significantly reduce the 
effect of this cognitive bias.29 Part V notes that judicial participation 
during plea discussions has the capacity to resolve many of the current 
problems identified with the plea-bargaining process in Part I.30 Finally, 
Part VI argues that most of the problems associated with judicial par-
ticipation in plea discussions are overstated and avoidable.31 
                                                                                                                      
24 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 
54 Am. J. Comp. L. 199, 242, 249 (2006). 
25 Turner, supra note 24, at 242, 249. 
26 See infra notes 32–156 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 157–179 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 180–252 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 253–354 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 355–394 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 395–422 and accompanying text. 
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I. Current Problems with the Plea-Bargaining Process 
 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 410, statements made by a defen-
dant during plea discussions with opposing counsel are inadmissible.32 
Nevertheless, defendants hoping to engage in plea bargaining with 
prosecutors will face several potential pitfalls. First, courts have applied 
a caveat accused approach under Rule 410, placing the heavy burden on 
criminal defendants to prove that their statements were actually made 
during plea discussions rather than more informal or preliminary dis-
cussions.33 Second, even when prosecutors clearly inform defendants 
that they are about to engage in plea discussions, they often place a 
condition on the process: For the defendant to get to the plea-bargain-
ing table, he must waive the protections of Rule 410.34 This permits the 
prosecutor to use the defendant’s plea-related statements for im-
peachment or even as substantive evidence in the event that a bargain 
is not reached and the case proceeds to trial.35 Finally, prosecutors of-
ten force defendants to sign a waiver of their appellate rights before 
agreeing to a plea bargain.36 
 Criminal defendants are also often saddled with public defenders 
who lack the training, resources, and time to be able to either defend 
their cases effectively at trial or drive a hard bargain during plea discus-
sions.37 Furthermore, when defendants enter into a plea bargain, they 
do not understand, nor do they benefit from, the toothless judicial re-
view of that bargain by a theretofore uninvolved judge.38 Such review is 
unlikely to expose the prosecutor’s coercion or the defendant’s confu-
sion.39 
                                                                                                                      
32 Fed. R. Evid. 410(a); see infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 43–79 and accompanying text. The “caveat accused approach” de-
scribes an approach that places this burden on the defendant. Colin Miller, Caveat Prosecu-
tor: Where Courts Went Wrong in Applying Robertson’s Two-Tiered Analysis to Plea Bargaining, 
and How to Correct Their Mistakes, 32 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 209, 209–13 
(2006). Alternatively, courts have taken a “caveat prosecutor approach,” which places the 
burden on the prosecution to prove that discussions with the defendant were not plea 
discussions protected by Rule 410. United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 
1977); Miller, supra, at 210. 
34 See infra notes 80–127 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 80–117 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 118–127 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 128–139 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 140–156 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 140–156 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Courts’ Caveat Accused Approach to Federal Rule of Evidence 410 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a) renders certain pleas and plea-
related statements inadmissible “against the defendant who made the 
plea or participated in the plea discussions.”40 One such plea-related 
statement is “a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney 
for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty 
plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.”41 Accordingly, in 
cases in which a defendant makes self-incriminatory statements during 
formal plea discussions with the prosecutor, Rule 410(a)(4) typically 
renders such statements inadmissible against the defendant.42 
                                                                                                                      
40 Fed. R. Evid. 410(a). Evidence of withdrawn guilty pleas has been inadmissible in 
federal prosecutions since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Kercheval v United 
States. Id. 410 advisory committee’s note; 274 U.S. 220, 223–25 (1927). In Kercheval, the 
Court reasoned: 
The effect of the court's order permitting the withdrawal was to adjudge that 
the plea of guilty be held for naught. Its subsequent use as evidence against 
petitioner was in direct conflict with that determination. When the plea was 
annulled it ceased to be evidence. By permitting it to be given weight the 
court reinstated it pro tanto. . . . Giving to the withdrawn plea any weight is in 
principle quite as inconsistent with the prior order as it would be to hold the 
plea conclusive. Under the charge, if the plea was found not improperly ob-
tained, the jury was required to give it weight unless petitioner was shown to 
be innocent. And if admissible at all, such plea inevitably must be so consid-
ered. As a practical matter, it could not be received as evidence without put-
ting petitioner in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with the determination of 
the court awarding him a trial. . . . The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a poor 
privilege, if, notwithstanding its withdrawal, it may be used in evidence under 
the plea of not guilty. 
274 U.S. at 224 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the New 
York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of admissibility of withdrawn pleas in 1961 in 
People v. Spitaleri, it noted that allowing withdrawn pleas to be admitted in evidence would 
effectively force the defendant to take the stand. 173 N.E.2d, 36–37 (N.Y. 1961); see Fed. R. 
Evid. 410 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he [Spitaleri] court pointed out that the effect of 
admitting the plea was to compel defendant to take the stand by way of explanation and to 
open the way for the prosecution to call the lawyer who had represented him at the time of 
entering the plea.”). Further, the inadmissibility of withdrawn guilty pleas encourages plea 
bargaining. See Fed. R. Evid. 410 advisory committee’s note. 
41 Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(4). Federal Rule of Evidence 410 renders other kinds of plea-
related statements inadmissible, including “a statement made during a proceeding on 
either [a guilty plea that was later withdrawn or a nolo contendere plea] under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure.” Id. para. (a)(3). 
42 See id para. (a)(4). For example, in 2005 in United States v. Stein, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the admissibility of statements 
made to an Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) in the course of formal plea discussions ar-
ranged by counsel. No. CR. 04-269-9, 2005 WL 1377851, at *12–14 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2005). 
The court reasoned: 
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 In other cases, it is unclear whether conversations between a de-
fendant and a prosecutor are too preliminary or informal to be classi-
fied as “plea discussions” under Rule 410(a)(4). In these cases, the ma-
jority of courts have applied a two-tiered analysis—derived from the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 1976 en banc opinion in 
United States v. Robertson—to determine whether such discussions are 
plea discussions.43 In Robertson, Drug Enforcement Administration 
                                                                                                                      
In sum, on these facts, where a represented defendant made statements to an 
[AUSA] in formal proffer sessions that defense counsel specifically requested 
be “off-the-record” . . . , the Court finds the defendant’s statements inadmis-
sible under . . . FRE 410 as statements “made in the course of plea discussions 
with an attorney for the prosecuting authority.” 
Id. at *14. 
43 582 F.2d 1356, 1366–67 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); see Miller, supra note 33, at 232–34 
(noting how all but a handful of courts have adopted the Robertson analysis). Five circuits 
have explicitly adopted the Robertson test, a two-part test that determines “first, whether the 
accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the 
discussion, and, second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the total-
ity of the objective circumstances.” Id. In 1983, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed the two-part Robertson test in United States v. Conaway. 11 F.3d 40, 42 (5th 
Cir. 1983) (“This circuit uses a two-part test to evaluate such claims.”). The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explicitly adopted it in 1993 in United States v. Little. Nos. 92-
6719, 92-6720 92-6721, 1993 WL 501570, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (“In [reviewing the 
finding of fact that discussions were plea discussions], we adopt the test set forth in United 
States v. Robertson . . . .”). In 1980, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
adopted Robertson in United States v. O’Brien. 618 F.2d 1234, 1240–41 (7th Cir. 1980) (“In 
determining whether a discussion can be properly characterized as a plea negotiation, we 
must consider the accused’s subjective expectation of negotiating a plea at the time of the 
discussion, and the reasonableness of that expectation.”). The U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have also adopted Robertson. United States v. Knight, 867 
F.2d 1285, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The trial court first determines whether the accused 
exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, 
and then determines whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality 
of the objective circumstances.”); United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(“This court, following United States v. Robertson, has adopted a bifurcated test to establish 
the admissibility of statements made during what are assertedly plea negotiations . . . .”) 
(citation omitted). In three other circuits, the Second, Fourth, and Tenth, district courts 
have adopted the Robertson test. Miller, supra note 33, at 233; see, e.g., United States v. 
Kearns, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1315 (D. Kan. 2000) (“A statement is made in the course of 
plea discussions with a United States Attorney if (1) the suspect exhibited an actual subjec-
tive expectation that he was negotiating a plea at the time of the discussion, and (2) his 
expectation was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.”); United States v. 
Bridges, 46 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“Although no such test has been adopted 
in this circuit, other courts have applied a two-tiered test that focuses on the speaker's state 
of mind, and asks whether his subjective expectation that a statement is being made in the 
course of plea discussions was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circum-
stances.”); United States v. Fronk, 173 F.R.D. 59, 67 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“I believe the Robert-
son two-tiered analysis to be the appropriate vehicle for analyzing [the defendant’s] sup-
pression claims.”). Out of all the circuit courts, only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
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agents arrested Andrew Robertson and his confederate, William Burti-
gan.44 As the agents were about to transport the arrestees to a court-
house for arraignment, Robertson and his confederate struck up a 
conversation with the agents in the parking lot.45 Robertson later 
moved to suppress statements made during this conversation, claiming 
that they were made during plea discussions.46 
 In addressing this issue, the Fifth Circuit found that when deter-
mining whether discussions are “plea discussions” for Rule 410(a)(4) 
purposes, “[t]he trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and deter-
mine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expecta-
tion to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, 
whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of 
the objective circumstances.”47 The Fifth Circuit ended this conclusion 
with a footnote, which stated in relevant part: 
While the government apparently bears the burden of prov-
ing that the discussion was not a plea negotiation once the is-
sue has been properly raised, See United States v. Herman, 544 
F.2d at 799 n. 12, we need not decide the weight of that bur-
den here. Here, though the issue was first raised on appeal, 
we are able to reach our result because the record is void of 
any significant indications of plea negotiations.48 
 As this footnote makes clear, in Robertson, the Fifth Circuit relied 
upon its opinion in Herman to reach the apparent conclusion that, 
when the issue is properly raised by the defendant, the prosecution 
bears the burden of proving that a discussion is not a plea discussion.49 
In Herman, the Fifth Circuit indeed placed the burden of proof on the 
prosecution as part of a prosecutor-beware interpretation of Rule 
                                                                                                                      
Circuit has explicitly rejected the Robertson analysis. Miller, supra note 33, at 233; see United 
States v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 818 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 does not embrace the two-part Robertson test and deciding that plea discus-
sions mean plea discussions). 
44 582 F.2d at 1359. The Drug Enforcement Administration agents also arrested 
Robertson’s “lady friend” and Burtigan’s wife. Id. 
45 Id. Robertson and his confederate made the statements hoping for leniency for the 
two women the agents had arrested. Id. at 1360–62. 
46 Id. at 1359. 
47 Id. at 1366. 
48 Id. at 1366 n.21 (citation omitted). 
49 Id. (citing Herman, 544 F.2d at 799 n.12). Herman was superseded by statute on a dif-
ferent point, as explained by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s 1985 decision 
in United States v. Keith. 764 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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410(a)(4).50 Robertson was consistent with this caveat prosecutor approach, 
with (1) the majority citing Herman for the proposition that Rule 
410(a)(4) can apply regardless of whether the start of plea discussions 
was specifically announced,51 and (2) a special concurrence determin-
ing that the Rule’s operation should not depend on the utterance of 
“magic words” related to plea bargaining.52 
 As noted, nearly every court has adopted Robertson’s two-tiered 
analysis for determining whether a discussion is a plea discussion for 
Rule 410(a)(4) purposes.53 At the same time, almost all of these courts 
have explicitly or implicitly refused to place the burden of proof on the 
prosecution; instead, they have replaced the caveat prosecutor approach 
with a caveat accused approach, in which defendants must affirmatively 
prove that they satisfy both tiers of the Robertson analysis.54 
 For instance, in 1994, in State v. Traficante, the Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island addressed a case where the defendant moved to suppress 
                                                                                                                      
50 Herman, 544 F.2d at 796. According to the court in Herman: 
The legal battleground has thus shifted from the propriety of plea bargaining 
to how best to implement and oversee the process. Plea bargaining is a tool of 
conciliation. It must not be a chisel of deceit or a hammered purchase and 
sale. The end result must come as an open covenant, openly arrived at with 
judicial oversight. A legal plea bargain is made in the sunshine before the pe-
nal bars darken. Accordingly, we must examine plea bargains under the doc-
trine of caveat prosecutor. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
51 582 F.2d at 1367 (quoting Herman, 544 F.2d at 797) (“To allow the government to in-
troduce statements uttered in reliance on the rule would be to use the rule as a sword 
rather than a shield. This we cannot allow; the rule was designed only as a shield.”). 
52 Id. at 1371–72 (Morgan, J., concurring). The concurring judges reasoned: 
The point is, however, that at the time a confession is given, which is the rele-
vant time for characterizing the transaction, the parties are ordinarily con-
templating that no trial contest of the question of guilt will ensue. When such 
a confession is the result of bargaining, I do not believe the protection of the 
rules should depend on whether the accused utters a few magic words like, 
“and, of course, I'm also going to plead guilty.” As the court has observed, “if 
we are overly exacting in deciding which statements come within this stan-
dard, we will deter the unrestrained candor that often produces effective plea 
negotiations.” Thus, I conclude that ordinarily a bargained for confession is 
tantamount to a plea negotiation because the reasonable expectation of all 
parties is that the question of innocence will be disposed of without trial.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
53 See Miller, supra note 33, at 232–34. 
54 See id. (“[C]ourts almost categorically failed to mention the footnote in Robertson 
immediately succeeding its two-tiered analysis. The footnote stated that the burden of 
proof was on the government in most cases. Both the phrase ‘caveat prosecutor’ and the 
substance of the doctrine were consistently ignored.”). 
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statements that he made during a meeting with an assistant attorney 
general because he claimed that the statements were made during plea 
discussions.55 In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island adopted Robertson’s two-tiered analysis, yet applied a caveat ac-
cused approach.56 The court found that the meeting was not a plea dis-
cussion because defense counsel admitted that “the words ‘plea bar-
gain’ or ‘negotiate a guilty plea’ were never mentioned in arranging 
the . . . meeting.”57 
 In reaching this conclusion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court re-
lied upon the 1989 opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maine in United States v. Lau.58 In Lau, the court rejected a defendant’s 
claim that a meeting with an Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) was a 
plea discussion because the words “plea,” “charge,” and “indictment” 
were never used.”59 The court acknowledged that defense counsel 
thought that the meeting was a plea discussion and that the defendant 
might have subjectively expected that he was negotiating a plea.60 
Nonetheless, because the defendant failed to prove that his expectation 
was objectively reasonable, the court found that Rule 410(a)(4) was in-
applicable.61 
 Alternatively, although some courts have not explicitly placed the 
burden of proof on the defendant, their analyses reveal how a defen-
dant could think that he was negotiating a plea,  but in reality have no 
protection under Rule 410(a)(4). For instance, in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 8th Circuit’s 1995 decision in United States v. Hare, Kevin 
Hare appealed his convictions for wire fraud and money laundering, 
alleging, inter alia, that the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress statements that he made in an initial meeting with an 
AUSA.62 The Eighth Circuit found that, at the initial meeting: 
                                                                                                                      
55 636 A.2d 692, 693 (R.I. 1994). 
56 See id. at 696 (focusing on whether the defendant could demonstrate to the court 
that he had a subjective belief of entering into plea discussions and if he could demon-
strate that his belief was objectively reasonable). 
57 Id. at 697. 
58 Id. (citing United States v. Lau, 711 F. Supp. 40, 42–43 (D. Me. 1989)). 
59 See 711 F. Supp. at 42. 
60 See id. at 43. (“Pomeroy stated at the hearing that he considered the interchange to 
be negotiations concerning disposition of the matter, and that his purpose was for Defen-
dant to have contact with the Government and not be charged.”). 
61 See id. 
62 49 F.3d 447, 448–49, 451 (8th Cir. 1995). Hare was involved in an insurance fraud 
scheme. Id. at 449. Government investigations into Hare’s scheme led agents to his office 
on October 14, 1992. Then, the following events occured: 
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The AUSA acknowledged that he and Hare had discussed the 
Sentencing Guidelines somewhat, but said they had done so 
only in general terms and not for the purpose of negotiating a 
plea. At Hare’s inquiry, the AUSA informed him that the 
Guidelines would call for definite jail time, absent coopera-
tion due to the amount of money involved. Specifically, the 
AUSA “told him that a 5K motion would reduce his exposure 
under the guidelines” but further testified that they “did not 
discuss the specifics of where the guidelines came out.” The 
AUSA did not discuss specific charges with Hare and did not 
offer any plea bargain.63 
 Thereafter, Hare continued cooperating with the government, and 
he eventually entered into a plea bargain.64 Later, however, Hare 
stopped cooperating under the plea agreement.65 The prosecution sub-
sequently presented his self-incriminatory statements from the initial 
meeting at his trial.66 In rejecting Hare’s ensuing Rule 410(a)(4) ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that even though Hare might have 
hoped to improve his position, his statements were not made in the 
course of plea discussions because no plea bargain was contemplated 
or offered at that time.67 
 Such a reading of Rule 410(a)(4) is not only inconsistent with a 
caveat prosecutor approach, but is also in tension with the Advisory 
Committee’s Notes. In 1979, decades before the Hare opinion, the 
Rules regarding the inadmissibility of statements made during plea dis-
cussions were amended for purposes of clarification.68 According to the 
                                                                                                                      
[The agents] showed him the evidence that they had gathered against him 
through their investigation. Hare said that he had been expecting them and 
showed them a written confession that he had already been preparing. Hare 
chose to accompany the agents to the United States Attorney's office for an 
interview with them and the [AUSA]. During that interview, Hare admitted 
with remorse and without condition that he had participated in the scheme 
. . . . 
Id. 
63 Id. at 451 (citation omitted). 
64 Id. The offer Hare accepted required him to cooperate with the government. Id. 
65 See id. at 450–51. 
66 Id. at 451. 
67 Id. 
68 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1979 amendment). The clarifica-
tion was necessary because the prior language was confusing and caused inconsistent re-
sults. See Fed. R. Evid. 410 advisory committee’s note (1979 amendment); Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11 advisory committee’s note (1979 amendment); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1597, at 1–14 (1974). 
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Advisory Committee, “the amendment ensure[d] ‘that even an attempt 
to open plea bargaining [is] covered under the same rule of inadmissi-
bility.’”69 
 Nevertheless, some courts have flatly concluded that preliminary 
discussions and attempts to open plea bargaining are not plea discus-
sions.70 For example, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 
1990 decision in United States v. Penta, a United States Attorney thought 
that a suspect “‘was trying to get us to agree not to prosecute him, or 
get us to agree that we would recommend probation or a minimum jail 
sentence . . . .’”71 The United States Attorney encouraged the defen-
dant to tell him everything, but when the defendant repeatedly asked 
him what would happen if he cooperated, the United States Attorney 
told him that he could not promise anything.72 
 When the suspect later made self-incriminatory statements, the 
First Circuit construed them as part of an attempt to open plea bar-
gaining and rejected the argument that these statements were covered 
by Rule 410(a)(4)73 The court reasoned that “plea discussions means 
plea discussions.”74 Accordingly, the court explicitly rejected the claim 
that “preliminary discussion must be considered as part of the overall 
plea-bargaining process.”75 Similarly, in State v. Murray, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Tennessee in 1998 flatly rejected the defendant’s 
claims that offers to enter into plea negotiations are plea discussions.76 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1979 amendment) (quoting United 
States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137, 1139 (6th Cir. 1976)). 
70 See Miller, supra note 33, at 234–235; see also, e.g., Penta, 898 F.2d at 818 (refusing to 
find that a preliminary discussion constitutes a part of an overall plea-bargaining process); 
State v. Murray, No. 01C01-9702-CR-00066, 1998 WL 934578, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Dec. 30, 1998) (finding that for statements to be protected, they must be “made in connec-
tion with, and relevant to a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere,” and therefore that 
preliminary discussions—such as those conducted with a police officer—will not be pro-
tected) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
71 898 F.2d at 816. 
72 Id. at 817. 
73 See id. at 817–18. 
74 Id. at 818 (quoting United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 849 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
75 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
76 1998 WL 934578, at *18. The Murray court reasoned: 
James Murray contends that his statements were inadmissible under Rule 
11(e)(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure because they were of-
fers to enter into plea negotiations. We disagree. . . . Before Rule 11(e)(6) 
can be invoked to exclude statements made by an accused, the statements 
must be “made in connection with, and relevant to” a plea of guilty or a plea 
of nolo contendere. Therefore, this Rule is inapplicable in this case because, 
as a police officer, Detective Moran could not have entered into a plea bar-
gain agreement with Mr. Murray. This issue has no merit. 
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 In sum, the above opinions make clear that courts have created a 
caveat accused approach to Rule 410(a)(4). Thus, if a defendant is 
charged with a crime and attempts to open plea bargaining with the 
prosecutor, that prosecutor will almost certainly be able to introduce at 
trial any self-incriminatory statements made by the defendant during 
his attempt.77 Furthermore, if a defendant makes self-incriminatory 
statements while honestly thinking that he is already engaged in plea 
discussions with a prosecutor, his statements will be admissible, unless 
he can prove that his expectation was objectively reasonable.78 Under 
the caveat accused approach, the defendant bears the burden of proving 
that his statements are admissible, and he must do so by satisfying 
Robertson’s two-tiered analysis: (1) that he subjectively expected that he 
was negotiating a plea; and (2) that his expectation was reasonable, 
given the totality of the objective circumstances.79 
B. Forced Waiver of the Plea-Related Rules and Appellate Review 
 The prosecution may also make a defendant waive certain rights 
before entering into plea discussions. For example, the prosecutor can 
ask the defendant to waive the protections of Rule 410.80 These waivers 
principally take one of four forms: (1) an impeachment waiver is one 
that permits the use of a defendant’s statements for purposes of im-
peachment;81 (2) a rebuttal waiver allows the prosecution to use the 
defendant’s statements to rebut arguments, or evidence, offered on the 
defendant’s behalf; (3) a case-in-chief waiver allows admission of the 
defendant’s statements for purposes of proving the prosecution’s case-
in-chief;82 and (4) appeals waivers may cause defendants to waive their 
right to appellate review.83 
1. Mezzanatto and the Forced Waiver of Rule 410 
a. Mezzanatto and Impeachment Waivers 
 Even after the difficulties associated with proving formal plea dis-
cussions are resolved by requests—or agreements—to engage in plea 
                                                                                                                      
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
77 See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text. 
78 See supra notes 53–69 and accompanying text. 
79 See Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366; Miller, supra note 33, at 241–43. 
80 See infra notes 80–127 and accompanying text.  
81 See infra notes 84–99 and accompanying text (impeachment waivers). 
82 See infra notes 100–117 and accompanying text (rebuttal and case-in-chief waivers). 
83 See infra notes 118–127 and accompanying text (appeals waivers). 
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discussions, defendants will face additional problems. For example, 
once prosecutors inform defendants that plea discussions are about to 
begin, they will typically force defendants to sign a waiver to reach the 
plea-bargaining table. This waiver is known as a proffer agreement, or 
“Queen for a Day” agreement, and it communicates to defendants that 
they are, in some way, waiving the protections of Rule 410(a)(4).84 
 The U.S. Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to this practice in its 
1995 opinion in United States v. Mezzanatto.85 In Mezzanatto, the State 
charged Gary Mezzanatto with possession of methamphetamine.86 The 
prosecutor later informed Mezzanatto and his attorney that, as a condi-
tion to proceeding with a plea meeting, Mezzanatto “would have to 
agree that any statements he made during the meeting could be used 
                                                                                                                      
84 See United States v. Parra, 302 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230–31 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Prof-
fer agreements are also sometimes called Mezzanatto agreements after the Supreme Court 
case or ‘Queen for a Day’ agreements.”). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York in 2004 in United States v. Parra included the proffer agreement in its reported 
opinion. Id. at 230. This agreement was the “standard proffer agreement” of the U.S. At-
torney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. See id. at 230, 237. The agreement 
read in relevant part: 
The following understandings exist: 
(1) THIS IS NOT A COOPERATION AGREEMENT. The Client has agreed 
to provide the Government with information, and to respond to questions, so 
that the Government may evaluate Client's information and responses in 
making prosecutive decisions . . . . 
(2) In any prosecution brought against Client by this Office, except as pro-
vided below the Government will not offer in evidence on its case-in-chief, or 
in connection with any sentencing proceeding for the purpose of determin-
ing an appropriate sentence, any statements made by Client at the meeting, 
except in a prosecution for false statements, obstruction of justice or perjury 
with respect to any acts committed or statements made during or after the 
meeting or testimony given after the meeting. 
(3) Notwithstanding item (2) above: . . . (b) in any prosecution brought 
against Client, the Government may use statements made by Client at the 
meeting . . . for the purpose of cross-examination should Client testify; and 
(c) the Government may also use statements made by Client (including ar-
guments made or issues raised sua sponte by the District Court) at any stage 
of the criminal prosecution (including bail, all phases of trial, and sentenc-
ing) in any prosecution brought against Client. 
. . . . 
(9) Client and Attorney acknowledge that they have fully discussed and un-
derstand every paragraph and clause in this Agreement and the conse-
quences thereof. 
Id. at 230–31. 
85 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995) (“We hold that absent some affirmative indication that the 
agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the ex-
clusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.”). 
86 Id. at 198. 
1682 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:1667 
to impeach any contradictory testimony he might give at trial if the case 
proceeded that far.”87 Mezzanatto signed a waiver to this effect (i.e., an 
impeachment waiver) and, after the prosecutor caught him in a series 
of lies, the meeting short was cut short.88 At his trial, Mezzanatto began 
providing testimony that contradicted some of his statements during 
the plea meeting.89 Over defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor 
impeached Mezzanatto with his prior inconsistent statements.90 
 After Mezzanatto was convicted, he appealed, claiming, inter alia, 
that prosecutors cannot force defendants to waive the protections of 
Rule 410(a)(4) in order to commence plea discussions.91 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed, noting that plea bargains are important to both the ac-
cuser and the accused because they provide a speedy and economical way 
to resolve cases while preserving the administration of justice.92 
 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, finding that defendants 
can waive the protections of Rule 410(a)(4) in the same way that they 
can waive many other rules of evidence and criminal procedure.93 In a 
concurring opinion joined by Justices Breyer and O’Connor, Justice 
Ginsburg clarified that the Court merely held “that a waiver allowing 
the Government to impeach with statements made during plea nego-
tiations is compatible with Congress’ intent to promote plea bargain-
ing.”94 She warned, though, that a waiver to use statements made dur-
ing plea negotiations in the case-in-chief would inhibit plea bargaining 
by more severely undermining a defendant’s incentive to negotiate.95 
Nevertheless, because the waiver in Mezzanatto was not this type of 
waiver, Justice Ginsburg left this issue for another day.96 
 In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter 
reframed Justice Ginsburg’s concern in a different way. According to 
Justice Souter, “[A]lthough the erosion of the Rules has begun with this 
trickle, the majority’s reasoning will provide no principled limit to it.”97 
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 198–99. 
89 Id. at 199. 
90 Id. 
91 United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1453–54 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d 513 U.S. 
196 (1995). 
92 See id. at 1454–56. 
93 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200–210. 
94 Id. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter said this was because “[t]he Rules 
draw no distinction between use of a statement for impeachment and use in the Govern-
ment’s case in chief.” Id. 
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He reasoned, therefore, that “[i]f objection can be waived for im-
peachment use, it can be waived for use as affirmative evidence, and if 
the Government can effectively demand waiver in the former instance, 
there is no reason to believe it will not do so just as successfully in the 
latter.”98 Justice Souter then warned that “[w]hen it does, there is noth-
ing this Court will legitimately be able to do about it.”99 
b. Mezzanatto’s Aftermath: Case-in-Chief Waivers and Rebuttal Waivers 
 Justice Souter’s words ended up being prophetic. After Mezzanatto, 
five circuits have addressed the issue of whether a prosecutor, as a pre-
condition for plea bargaining, can force an accused to sign a waiver 
permitting the use of his statements during plea discussions as part of 
the State’s case-in-chief.100 Those circuits—the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, 
Tenth, and D.C.—have all endorsed case-in-chief waivers.101 Although 
the First Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether case-in-
chief waivers are enforceable, a district court in the First Circuit has 
upheld such a waiver.102 It is unclear, however, whether other district 
courts in the First Circuit will reach the same conclusion. 
 Although the remaining circuits have not addressed the issue of 
case-in-chief waivers, each circuit has approved the use of rebuttal waiv-
ers.103 Whereas the impeachment waiver permits prosecutors to im-
                                                                                                                      
98 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 455 F. App’x 343, 345 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Absent 
fraud, coercion, or some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered into un-
knowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of Rule 410 
is valid and enforceable . . . .”); United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 1000–01, 1006 
(10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court did not err when it allowed a case-in-chief 
waiver); United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 288–90 (5th Cir. 2009) (ruling there was 
no reason not to enforce case-in-chief waivers); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909–
11 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that Mezzanatto permits case-in-chief waivers); United States 
v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1320–22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reasoning there is no rationale for not 
extending Mezzanatto to case-in-chief waivers). 
101 See, e.g., Stevens, 455 F. App’x at 345; Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1000–01; Sylvester, 583 F.3d 
at 288–90; Young, 223 F.3d at 909–11; Burch, 156 F.3d at 1320–22. 
102 See United States v. DeLaurentiis, 638 F. Supp. 2d 76, 76, 79 (D. Me. 2009) (ruling 
that since the defendant waived her rights under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the government may use all the evidence in question against her). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008) (extending 
Mezzanatto to rebuttal waivers); United States v. Artis, 261 F. App’x 176, 177–79 (11th Cir. 
2008) (reasoning that Mezzanatto allows rebuttal waivers); United States v. Fifer, 206 F. 
App’x 502, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2006) (enforcing a rebuttal waiver); United States v. Velez, 354 
F.3d 190, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding rebuttal waivers enforceable); United States v. 
Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 406–08 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending Mezzanatto to rebuttal waivers); 
United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1024–26 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing rebuttal waivers). 
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peach testifying defendants with statements they made during plea dis-
cussions, a rebuttal waiver permits the prosecution to use a defendant’s 
plea statements if the defense presents any evidence contradicting the 
plea statements.104 Determining whether evidence is “contradictory 
evidence” depends upon the language of the plea agreement and the 
circuit in which the case is heard.105 
 For instance, in 2002, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit case United States v. Rebbe, the government suspected Roger 
Rebbe, an accountant, of preparing false tax returns.106 Rebbe and his 
attorney later met with federal agents and signed a waiver.107 In the 
event that a plea agreement was not reached, that waiver read: 
[T]he government may use . . . statements made by you or 
your client at the meeting and all evidence obtained directly 
or indirectly from those statements for the purposes of cross-
examination should your client testify, or to rebut any evi-
dence, argument or representations offered by or on behalf 
of your client in connection with the trial. 108 
 Thereafter, Rebbe made self-incriminatory statements, i.e., “prof-
fer statements,” during plea discussions, and the discussions did not 
result in a plea agreement.109 The government then informed Rebbe of 
its intent to introduce his self-incriminatory statements at trial under 
the terms of the waiver.110 Rebbe moved to exclude these statements 
under Rule 410(a)(4), but the district court denied his motion, con-
cluding that his statements would be “admissible to rebut any evidence 
or arguments he made at trial that were inconsistent with his proffer 
statements.”111 
 After the government rested its case at trial, Rebbe requested an 
advisory opinion “as to whether the admissibility of [his] proffer state-
ments had been triggered.”112 The district court refused to rule on the 
issue, prompting Rebbe to hedge his bets by presenting four defense 
                                                                                                                      
104 Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 291. 
105 Id. at 291 n.23 (citing Hardwick, 544 F.3d at 570; Velez, 354 F.3d at 196–97; Rebbe, 314 
F.3d at 406–08; Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1024–26). 





111 See id. at 404–05. 
112 Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 405. 
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witnesses, but not testifying on his own behalf.113 The gamble did not 
pay off; instead, at the close of his case, the government successfully 
moved to admit Rebbe’s statements as substantive evidence of his 
guilt.114 On Rebbe’s ensuing appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, hold-
ing that Rebbe’s defense—consisting of testimony from witnesses on 
both direct- and cross-examination—was inconsistent with his proffer 
statements.115 
 Similarly, in 2005, in Barrow v. United States, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit was presented with a waiver that allowed 
the prosecution to use proffer statements to "rebut any evidence.”116 
According to the Second Circuit, this waiver could be triggered not 
only by contradictory interrogation by defense counsel, but also by 
“[f]actual assertions made by a defendant’s counsel in an opening ar-
gument.”117 
 As Rebbe and Barrow illustrate, defendants waive their Rule 410 
rights to different degrees based both on the circuit where their case is 
heard and the language used in the rebuttal waiver. It is unclear how 
circuits that have approved of rebuttal waivers in unpublished opinions 
will treat these waivers in future cases. Furthermore, it is unclear how 
circuits that have approved of one type of rebuttal waiver will treat 
waivers that have different language. Finally, it is unclear how circuits 
that have approved of rebuttal waivers, but have not yet addressed the 
constitutionality of case-in-chief waivers, will handle these latter waivers. 
2. Forced Waiver of the Right to Appellate Review 
 In addition to typically requiring a Rule 410 waiver, prosecutors are 
also likely to insist on an appeal waiver before reaching a plea agree-
                                                                                                                      
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 Id. at 407 (“[Given] that Rebbe presented a defense that was inconsistent with his 
proffer statements and the Government did not seek to admit Rebbe’s proffer statements 
in its case-in-chief, we cannot discern any error on the part of the district court in admit-
ting Rebbe’s proffer statements in rebuttal.”). 
116 400 F.3d 109, 113–14, 116 (2d Cir. 2005). The entire relevant section of the proffer 
agreement stated:  
[The government could] use [the defendant’s] proffer statements as leads to 
other evidence; as substantive evidence to cross-examine him; and as substan-
tive evidence to rebut any evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions 
made, by or on behalf of [the defendant] at any stage of a criminal prosecu-
tion (including but not limited to detention hearing, trial, or sentencing). 
Id. at 113–14 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117 Id. at 118. 
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ment.118 Appeal waivers are “clauses in plea agreements by which de-
fendants waive their rights to appellate and postconviction review of 
sentencing errors.”119 Courts have been as receptive to appeal waivers 
as they have been to rebuttal waivers, with every federal circuit court 
holding appeal waivers valid.120 
 Appeal waivers take various forms. For example, in 2005, in United 
States v. Blick, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed 
a waiver which stated: 
[T]he defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the 
conviction and any sentence within the maximum provided in 
the statute of conviction (or the manner in which that sen-
tence was determined) . . . on any ground whatsoever, in ex-
change for the concessions made by the United States in this 
plea agreement.121 
 In a 2008 case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, United States v. Azure, the defendant signed a waiver under 
which she waived “any right to appeal any and all motions, defenses, 
probable cause determinations, and objections which she has asserted 
or could assert to this prosecution, and to the Court’s entry of judg-
ment against her and imposition of sentence, including sentence ap-
peals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.”122 Finally, in a 2007 U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Novosel, the defendant 
signed a waiver waiving his right to appeal “any matter in connection 
with [the] prosecution, conviction, and sentence.”123 
                                                                                                                      
118 See generally Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sen-
tencing Policy, 55 Duke L.J. 209 (2005) (analyzing the prevalence of appeal waivers in plea 
agreements). In the first empirical study of appeal waivers, the authors reviewed 971 ran-
domly selected 2003 cases that were coded as including a written plea agreement or other 
agreement and found that 65.2% of them contained some type of appeal waiver clause. Id. 
at 209, 225, 231. 
119 Id. at 211. 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1329–30 (10th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003); In re Sealed Case, 283 F.3d 349, 355 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561–62 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21–26 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 
(2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916–18 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 
399, 402 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168–70 (11th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Melancon, 972 
F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992). 
121 408 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2005). 
122 536 F.3d 922, 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2008). 
123 481 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2007). 
2013] Anchoring Effect and Judicial Participation in Plea Discussions 1687 
 These differences are not merely semantic; even small differences 
among appeal waivers may lead to unexpectedly divergent results.124 
And courts in different jurisdictions can read the same language in ap-
peal waivers as producing different results. For example, courts have 
reached different results on the issue of whether defendants can waive 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining as 
part of an appeal waiver.125 Moreover, courts have split over whether 
judges must engage defendants in explicit discussions regarding their 
waiver of appellate rights at their plea hearings.126 
 To reduce the risk of an appeal waiver, defendants can limit its 
scope by reserving the right to appeal under certain circumstances.127 
Of course, this presumes that the defendant or defense counsel realizes 
that the terms of such a waiver can be negotiated and has the savvy to 
procure meaningful concessions. As the next subsection reveals, this is 
not something that can be safely assumed. 
C. Public Defender Crisis 
 The problems plaguing many public defender systems exert a 
heavy burden on criminal defendants involved in plea negotiations. 
Despite some defendants having private attorneys of their own choos-
ing in such negotiations, public defenders represent around eighty 
percent of defendants.128 Moreover, about ninety percent of capital de-
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on ineffective assistance at sentencing.”), with United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th 
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126 Compare, e.g., United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871–72 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Al-
though it might have been preferable for the court to have conducted a colloquy with 
Michelsen regarding his waiver of appeal, such a dialogue is not a prerequisite for a valid 
waiver of the right to appeal.”), and United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 38 F.3d 394, 395 
(9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the argument that the judge must advise defendant of the waiver 
at the guilty plea hearing), with United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 
1993) (“[A] waiver is not knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifi-
cally question the defendant concerning the waiver provision of the plea agreement dur-
ing the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise 
understand the full significance of the waiver.”). 
127 King & O’Neill, supra note 118, at 242. 
128 Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, Bureau of Just. Stat. 4 
(Feb. 1996), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf. 
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fendants are appointed public defenders because of their indigence.129 
Surveys have shown that most public defender services suffer from con-
straints including vast caseloads, insufficient training, limited resources, 
as well as tremendous time pressure.130 
 The issues faced by public defenders pose a problem for defen-
dants during the plea-bargaining process. One scholar studied how 
public defenders conduct themselves during the plea-bargaining proc-
ess by observing and interviewing public defenders from 1984 to 
1988.131 She found that instead of using a more aggressive and proac-
tive approach toward research and investigation, defenders assume a 
more passive and reactive stance.132 As a result, defenders “may be less 
likely to find viable defenses than attorneys who represent wealthy cli-
ents with greater access to resources”133 and “presumably, more likely to 
accept a prosecutor’s plea offer.”134 
 Recently, these inadequacies have come to a head. In 2007, indi-
gent defendants in three Michigan counties sued the state, claiming 
“that the public defender systems in their counties [were] so bad that 
poor people [were] pleading guilty because, for all practical purposes, 
they [were] given no other choice.”135 Specifically, they alleged that 
that underfunded public defenders violated defendant’s rights by en-
couraging plea bargains instead of zealously fighting the charges.136 
 These criticisms have also come from public defenders themselves. 
In November 2008, public defenders’ offices in seven states protested 
these overwhelming workloads by either ceasing to take on new cases 
or suing to limit their caseloads.137 According to these offices, the ma-
                                                                                                                      
129 Adam Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representation of Criminal Defen-
dants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 Me. L. Rev. 97, 139 (2010) (quoting Jeffrey 
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Debra S. Emmelman’s study). 
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jority of a public defender’s workload has turned into processing guilty 
pleas.138 The demanding pace of representation has made the work of 
these public defenders a “plea bargain assembly line,” with the result of 
“less justice and more McJustice.”139 
D. Toothless Judicial Review of Plea Bargains 
 If the parties reach a plea agreement, the defendant is only enti-
tled to a plea hearing, where the judge determines whether the guilty 
plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.140 In cases governed by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this plea hearing is the first time 
a judge becomes involved with the plea-bargaining process.141 This is 
because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) allows the gov-
ernment’s attorney and the defendant—either through an attorney or 
self-representation—to negotiate a plea agreement.142 The court is not 
allowed to participate in these plea discussions.143 Although most state 
rules of criminal procedure follow the federal rules by not allowing 
judges to take part in these discussions, a growing number of states al-
low or encourage judges to participate in plea negotiations.144 
 Because most judges are not involved with plea negotiations until 
the plea hearing, after-the-fact review is difficult.145 In large part, this is 
because after parties agree to a plea bargain, they do not wish to pro-
vide the judge with any information that could disrupt the plea.146 Al-
though some judges request that defendants “allocute,” or concede 
that they are guilty, the judge does not conduct a trial or even cursorily 
review the evidence.147 One judge has described this process as “a five-
minute interview of the person, under Rule 11, getting a kind of half-
hearted, scripted confession as part of the guilty plea process.”148 Fur-
thermore, although some courts will engage a defendant in an explicit 
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discussion when a waiver is signed,149 others have found that such a dis-
cussion is not required.150 If the judge accepts the plea agreement, he 
incorporates the agreed-upon disposition into his judgment.151 
 Alternatively, judges can reject the plea.152 When judges reject the 
plea, they inform the parties of the rejection and advise the defendants 
that they can withdraw or maintain their guilty pleas; however, judges 
may still render a less favorable decision for defendants than what the 
plea agreement proposed.153 If the judge rejects the plea or the defen-
dant and prosecutor do not reach a plea agreement, the case proceeds 
to trial. If the defendant signed a case-in-chief waiver, the prosecution 
can present any self-incriminatory statements made by the defendant 
during plea discussions as part of its case-in-chief as substantive evi-
dence of guilt, even if the defendant chooses not to present any wit-
nesses or evidence.154 If the defendant signed a rebuttal waiver and 
wants to prevent self-incriminatory statements from being introduced, 
he must walk a tightrope—presenting some evidence to bolster his 
case, but not enough evidence to trigger the waiver.155 Finally, if the 
defendant signed an impeachment waiver and wants to testify in his 
own defense, he must balance the risk of impeachment based upon any 
inconsistent statements made during plea discussions against the risk of 
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination.156 
II. Judicial Involvement in Plea Bargaining 
 As noted, although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) 
and many state counterparts prohibit judges from participating in plea 
discussions, a growing minority of states allow or encourage judges to 
participate in such discussions.157 One state allowing judicial involve-
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2013] Anchoring Effect and Judicial Participation in Plea Discussions 1691 
ment in plea bargaining is Florida.158 Connecticut also allows judicial 
participation, but it follows a different model than Florida.159 
A. Florida’s Model of Judicial Involvement 
 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.171(d) appears to allow ju-
dicial involvement only after a plea has been reached. Rule 3.171(d) 
provides: 
After an agreement on a plea has been reached, the trial judge 
may have made known to him or her the agreement and rea-
sons therefor prior to the acceptance of the plea. Thereafter, 
the judge shall advise the parties whether other factors (un-
known at the time) may make his or her concurrence impossi-
ble.160 
 Furthermore, Florida case law also envisions limited judicial in-
volvement in plea discussions; nevertheless, in practice, Florida plea 
bargaining follows neither the rules, nor the case law.161 In fact, Florid-
ian judges typically become involved in plea discussions during the pre-
trial conferences as “a matter of course.”162 And because these discus-
sions occur during pretrial conferences, there is usually a public 
record, although off-the-record discussions occur from time to time.163 
 Whether these discussions take place on or off the record, negotia-
tions proceed similarly, with the prosecution usually presenting its posi-
tion first and laying out the material facts.164 The presentation usually 
reviews the defendant’s background, the circumstances of the crime, 
and the defendant’s score under Florida’s sentencing system.165 De-
fense counsel then responds to the prosecution with his or her own in-
terpretation of the facts and a request for a more lenient disposition.166 
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 After hearing the defense and prosecution, the judge reveals how 
he or she would dispose the case in an expected post-plea sentence.167 
Specifically, the recommendation usually takes the form of a sentence 
range, a cap, or a fixed sentence.168 As a general rule, Florida judges do 
not give information about the post-trial sentence possibilities, as de-
fendant may perceive these statements as coercing them into waiving 
their right to a trial.169 Rather, a typical comment might read as follows: 
I have not seen the witnesses and the other information that 
might come at trial, but just from the information I have here, 
I think that you would get X [years]. But if we go to trial, you 
might get a different sentence if a lot of the evidence is 
new.170 
B. Connecticut’s Model of Judicial Involvement 
 As with plea bargaining in Florida, Connecticut judges may, during 
pretrial conferences, become involved in plea negotiations.171 In Con-
necticut, however, the conferences are usually behind closed doors in 
the judge’s chambers and not officially recorded.172 When the judge 
first meets with both sides, the prosecution presents a brief summary of 
the case, and the defense may respond.173 
 In Connecticut, judges facilitate the negotiation, listening to each 
side’s arguments and proposing additional considerations.174 Judges 
are particularly engaged when they believe the case deserves little time 
in court.175 After each side presents its position, the judge usually tells 
the parties the expected post-plea sentence—most commonly a fixed 
sentence, but sometimes a sentence range or cap.176 Furthermore, 
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unlike Florida, judges in Connecticut will sometimes give the parties an 
estimate of the post-trial sentence.177 
 If the sides do not reach a plea agreement after plea discussions, 
Connecticut case law provides that only “a judge who was not involved 
in the plea negotiations and is unaware of the plea terms offered at pre-
trial [may] conduct the trial and post-trial sentencing phase.”178 More-
over, even motions to suppress must be heard by a judge different from 
the one who handled the plea negotiations.179 
III. Explaining the Anchoring Effect 
 The “anchoring effect” is a cognitive bias by which individuals 
evaluate numbers in relation to a reference point—the anchor—and 
then modify those numbers based on that “anchor.”180 The bias mani-
fests itself in three particular ways: (1) the selection of an anchor; (2) 
underadjustment; and (3) the fact that even arbitrary, random, or ir-
relevant numbers can serve as anchors and distort calculations.181 
A. Problem One: Selecting an Anchor 
 Selecting an anchor is often biased.182 Researchers conducted a 
study with nineteen pairs of students from the Heinz School at Carne-
gie Mellon University, sixty pairs of law students from the University of 
Texas, and fifteen pairs of students from the Wharton School at the 
University of Pennsylvania.183 The researchers gave each pair twenty-
seven pages of testimony that they abstracted from an actual Texas case 
involving a $100,000 suit for damages sustained in a car crash.184 
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 Along with the evidence, the subjects received additional informa-
tion.185 The researchers told the pairs that a Texas judge received the 
same materials and had decided an appropriate award.186 They also 
told each subject to make “two judgments: (1) what they thought was a 
fair settlement from the vantage point of a neutral third party; [and] 
(2) their best guess of the amount that the judge would award.”187 The 
subjects received a bonus of one dollar if their prediction was within 
$5000 of the judge’s actual award of $30,560.188 In addition, the re-
searchers addressed fees as follows: 
The subjects were each paid a fixed fee for participating in 
the experiment. They were instructed to try to negotiate an 
“out of court” settlement in the form of a monetary payment 
from the defendant to the plaintiff. Before the negotiation, 
the defendant was given $10 from which to make this pay-
ment. Every $10,000 from the case was equivalent to $1 for 
the subjects. For example, a $40,000 settlement meant the de-
fendant gave $4 to the plaintiff and kept $6.189 
 When the test subjects knew their role in the negotiation, their 
predictions of the judge’s award and evaluations of fairness tended to 
be self-serving.190 To carry out the study’s main variable, researchers 
told subjects in Group A whether they were the plaintiff or defendant 
before giving them their case materials, while subjects in Group B were 
told their roles after they received their case materials, submitted their 
thoughts on a fair settlement, and guessed the judge’s award.191 In 
Group A, there was a strong tendency toward self-serving judgments of 
fairness and predictions of the awards. The Group A plaintiffs and de-
fendants differed from the vantage point of a neutral third party in 
their thoughts regarding a fair settlement by an average of $19,756.192 
Their guesses regarding the amount that the judge would award dif-
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fered from the judge’s actual award by an average of $18,555.193 Both of 
these guesses were statistically different from zero.194 In Group B, the 
average differences were $6275 and $6936, neither of which was statisti-
cally different from zero.195 
 In addition to self-serving judgments, Group A subjects were less 
likely to reach a settlement. The Group A pairs only settled 27% of the 
time, after an average of 3.75 negotiation periods, whereas the subjects 
in Group B settled 94% of the time, after an average of 2.51 periods— 
both statistically significant differences.196 Alternatively put, “there were 
four times as many disagreements when bargainers knew their roles 
initially than when they did not know their roles.”197 
B. Problem Two: Underadjustment 
 Underadjustment is a second problem with the anchoring effect, 
and is consistent with the results of the Babcock study.198 Underadjust-
ment describes the observation that people typically do not adjust their 
position much away from their anchors.199 As a result of this phenome-
non, a party’s initial choice of anchors has an inordinate effect on its 
final estimates.200 The reason for this underadjustment is that “the an-
chor brings to mind features of the target that resemble the anchor, 
thus leading people to overemphasize similarities and underestimate 
differences.”201 The researchers in the pharmaceutical plant negotia-
tion study from the introduction found such an underadjustment, with 
the average purchase price for the plant being $24.8 million when the 
seller made the higher initial offer and $19.7 million when the buyer 
opened the bidding with a lower offer.202 
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 Researchers also found underadjustment in a study in which they 
told subjects that they purchased a BMW that occasionally stalled at 
stop lights and was extremely difficult to start in the morning.203 The 
researchers informed each subject that the BMW dealer claimed that 
the car was not defective, that the subject’s mechanic agreed that the 
problem could not be improved, and that the BMW dealer refused to 
refund the subject’s money.204 The subjects were then told that, accord-
ing to their lawyer, there could only be two outcomes if they went to 
trial: (1) the jury could find in their favor and award them a complete 
refund; or (2) the jury could find against them, and they would recover 
nothing.205 Finally, the researchers told each subject that the subject 
received and rejected a first offer from the BMW dealer and later re-
ceived a second offer of a $12,000 refund if the subject kept the car and 
dropped the lawsuit.206 The variable in this scenario was that research-
ers told subjects in Group A that the BMW dealer’s initial offer was 
$2000 and subjects in Group B that the BMW dealer’s initial offer was 
$10,000.207 
 The researchers then asked the subjects to rate the second offer 
from 1 to 5, with “definitely accept” scored as a “5,” “probably accept” 
scored as a “4,” “undecided” scored as a “3,” “probably reject” scored as 
a “2,” and “definitely reject” scored as a “1.”208 Group A subjects, who 
received the lower initial offer of $2000, responded with an average 
score of 3.54, which clearly favored acceptance of the final offer.209 
Group B subjects, who received the higher initial offer of $10,000, re-
sponded with an average score of 2.97, which narrowly disfavored ac-
ceptance of the final offer.210 The difference between the average 
scores of 3.54 and 2.97 is statistically significant.211 Furthermore, 63% 
of Group A subjects indicated that they would “definitely accept” or 
“probably accept” the $12,000 offer, whereas only 34% of Group B sub-
jects indicated the same, again a statistically significant result.212 
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 Scholars have since conducted a “meta-analysis” of studies by test-
ing the impact of opening figures in negotiation experiments.213 The 
study found a 0.497 correlation between the initial anchor and the final 
outcome of the negotiation, an unusually large correlation according to 
social and behavioral science standards.214 A correlation of 0.497 means 
that for every one dollar increase in the opening offer, there is a final 
sale price increase of nearly fifty percent.215 Put another way, “nearly 25 
percent of the difference in outcomes among negotiations can be ac-
counted for as a function of an opening offer or other initial anchor.”216 
C. Problem Three: Even Arbitrary, Random, or Irrelevant Numbers Can Serve 
as Anchors and Distort Calculations 
 The third main problem with the anchoring effect is that, because 
anchors can be arbitrary, random, or irrelevant numbers, and thus lead 
to distorted calculations.217 In one famous study, researchers had sub-
jects spin a “wheel of fortune” that was rigged to stop on the number 10 
or 65.218 After the subjects spun the wheel, the researchers asked the 
subjects whether the number that they spun was higher or lower than 
the percentage of African countries in the United Nations.219 The re-
searchers then asked the subjects to estimate the percentage of coun-
tries in the United Nations that are African; those who spun a 10 (the 
“low anchor” condition), on average guessed 25%, whereas those who 
spun a 65 (the “high anchor” condition), guessed 45% on average.220 
Even when the researchers offered to pay the subjects for accuracy, it 
did not decrease the anchoring effect.221 
 Researchers have found similar results in studies using mock jurors 
to evaluate plaintiff damage requests.222 When a plaintiff’s attorney re-
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quested $100,000 in damages in a fake case, mock jurors awarded 
slightly more than $90,000 in damages.223 But when the attorney re-
quested the exorbitant amount of $500,000 in damages in the very 
same case, the mock jurors awarded nearly $300,000.224 Other studies 
have also found that  even outlandish damage requests can influence a 
jury award.225 In one study, mock jurors gave the plaintiff a substantially 
higher award when the plaintiff’s lawyer requested $1 billion in dam-
ages than when the plaintiff’s lawyer made a more reasonable re-
quest.226 
 Researchers also have found similar results in studies with actual 
judges.227 In one study, researchers posed the following facts to federal 
magistrate judges: 
Suppose that you are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit 
that is in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The de-
fendant is a major company in the package delivery business. 
The plaintiff was badly injured after being struck by one of 
the defendant’s trucks when its brakes failed at a traffic light. 
Subsequent investigations revealed that the braking system on 
the truck was faulty, and that the truck had not been properly 
maintained by the defendant. The plaintiff was hospitalized 
for several months, and has been in a wheelchair ever since, 
unable to use his legs. He had been earning a good living as a 
free-lance electrician and had built up a steady base of loyal 
customers. The plaintiff has requested damages for lost wages, 
hospitalization, and pain and suffering, but has not specified 
an amount. Both parties have waived their rights to a jury 
trial.228 
 The researchers randomly assigned sixty-six judges to a “no-
anchor” condition and asked them how much they would award the 
plaintiff.229 They also randomly assigned fifty judges to an “anchor” 
condition, which provided that the defendant had moved to dismiss the 
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case for failure to satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction.230 
The researchers asked the judges in the anchor condition to rule on 
the motion and asked them what they would award the plaintiff if they 
denied the motion.231 The motion was meritless because it was clear 
that the plaintiff had incurred more than $75,000 in damages.232 Nev-
ertheless, the researchers believed that the motion would serve as a low 
anchor.233 Their hypothesis was realized: the judges in the anchor con-
dition awarded an average of $882,000, whereas judges in the no-
anchor condition awarded the plaintiff an average of $1,249,000—a 
statistically significant result.234 
 Researchers found similar results in a study of German judges and 
prosecutors.235 In the first iteration of the study, researchers gave the 
subjects case materials regarding a rape.236 After reviewing these mate-
rials, researchers told about half of the subjects that a journalist called 
them during a recess and asked whether they thought the sentence 
would be higher or lower than one year (the “low-anchor” condi-
tion).237 They told the other subjects that they also received a call, and 
that a journalist asked whether they thought the sentence would be 
higher or lower than three years (the “high-anchor” condition).238 The 
researchers told all subjects that they refused to answer the question.239 
They then asked the subjects whether they would tell a colleague that 
the sentence suggested by the journalist was too low, too high, or just 
right.240 
 The researchers then had the subjects sentence the defendant.241 
The subjects in the low-anchor condition sentenced the defendant to 
an average of 25.43 months’ incarceration, whereas the subjects in the 
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high-anchor condition sentenced the defendant to an average of 33.38 
months’ imprisonment—a statistically significant result.242 
 In the second iteration of the study, the researchers gave different 
subjects case materials regarding a shoplifting, with the only variable 
being that they told some subjects that the prosecutor demanded a sen-
tence of three months’ probation (the “low-anchor” condition), and 
other subjects that the prosecutor demanded nine months’ probation 
(the “high-anchor” condition).243 The researchers then asked the sub-
jects whether the prosecutor’s demand was too high, too low, or just 
right, and thereafter had the subjects sentence the defendant.244 Sub-
jects exposed to the low-anchor condition sentenced the defendant to 
an average of 4.00 months’ probation, whereas subjects exposed to the 
high-anchor condition sentenced the defendant to an average of 6.05 
months’ probation—also a statistically significant result.245 
 Finally, in the third iteration, the researchers kept the facts the 
same as in the second iteration, except that the prosecutor’s demand 
came from a roll of dice.246 Researchers gave about half of the subjects 
two dice that would always come up with the numbers one and two, and 
the other subjects two dice that would always come up with the num-
bers three and six.247 After the subjects rolled both dice, the researchers 
told them that the combined number that they rolled—three (the “low-
anchor” condition) or nine (the “high-anchor” condition)—was the 
number of months that the prosecutor demanded as a sentence.248 
 The researchers again asked the subjects whether this demand was 
too high, too low, or just right, and then they had the subjects sentence 
the defendant.249 Subjects in the low-anchor condition gave an average 
sentence of 5.28 months, whereas subjects in the high-anchor condition 
gave an average sentence of 7.81 months—a statistically significant dif-
ference.250 Based on these results, the researchers concluded that even 
“irrelevant anchor values that were obviously determined at random 
may influence sentencing decisions of legal professionals.”251 
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 Thus, the anchoring effect plays a large role in legal environments, 
and many legal bargaining theorists now recognize anchoring as a basic 
truth of civil negotiations.252 But does the anchoring effect play a simi-
lar role in criminal plea negotiations? 
IV. The Anchoring Effect in the Plea-Bargaining Process and 
How Judicial Involvement Can Decrease It 
 It is likely that the anchoring effect influences the plea-bargaining 
process.253 The three problems associated with the anchoring effect are 
manifested in the criminal justice system, and therefore support this 
conclusion. The parties in criminal negotiations have all been pre-
assigned their roles, leading to a biased selection of anchors.254 Fur-
thermore, the phenomenon of underadjustment explains why defen-
dants do not adjust away from the prosecution’s biased offers.255 Finally, 
defendants anchor on inaccurate plea offers because they fear convic-
tion on false charges.256 Judicial participation in plea discussions could 
reduce the anchoring effect in criminal negotiations.257 
A. The Likelihood That the Anchoring Effect Has a Significant Effect  
on the Plea-Bargaining Process 
 Although there have been many studies about the anchoring effect 
in civil negotiations, there have been very few studies of the anchoring 
effect in criminal negotiations.258 This is unsurprising. It does not take 
much for research subjects to place themselves in the shoes of an ag-
grieved BMW buyer or a potential pharmaceutical plant purchaser or 
seller. Conversely, having subjects put themselves in the shoes of a 
criminal defendant facing a murder rap, and either the death penalty or 
life imprisonment, seems like much more of a flight of fancy. In the civil 
setting, subjects should be able to accurately predict how they would 
deal with a settlement offer of $12,000 for an allegedly defective BMW. 
The same predictability does not extend to how they would deal with an 
offer to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for a rec-
ommendation of ten years’ incarceration. Moreover, in a study, it is dif-
ficult to replicate actual plea-bargaining conditions, such as the defen-
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dant’s likely pretrial detention, minimal resources, and inadequate rep-
resentation. This difficulty means that any such study would lack eco-
logical validity.259 Furthermore, although the researchers gave the sub-
jects in the BMW study conflicting evidence regarding whether the 
BMW was defective, researchers in a plea bargaining study presumably 
would need to tell subjects whether or not they committed the subject 
crime. 
 That said, plea-bargaining scholars have speculated that the an-
choring effect plays a large role in the plea-bargaining context. Accord-
ing to Professor Stephanos Bibas, the anchoring effect may play the 
same role in criminal negotiations between a prosecutor and a defen-
dant, as it does in negotiations between a plaintiff and a defendant.260 
Again, because the three main problems associated with the anchoring 
effect manifest themselves in the criminal justice system, this conclu-
sion makes sense. 
B. Problem One: Selection of an Anchor Is Often Biased 
 The first problem with the anchoring effect is that selecting an an-
chor is often biased.261 For instance, in the $100,000 car accident study, 
pairs of subjects without pre-assigned roles as plaintiffs and defendants 
differed in their thoughts regarding a fair settlement by an average of 
$6275, whereas pairs of subjects with pre-assigned roles differed by an 
average of $19,756.262 In the plea-bargaining context, the prosecutor is 
like the pre-assigned subject; he knows that he is the attorney for the 
prosecuting authority when he reviews the defendant’s case file and 
makes the initial offer during plea discussions. As a result, the anchor-
ing effect suggests that the selection of the initial offer (the anchor) 
will reflect the prosecution’s bias. 
 In addition to the anchoring effect, several other cognitive biases 
suggest that the prosecutor will make a high initial offer due to viewing 
the evidence in the light least favorable to the defendant. For example, 
it is well established that there is a “confirmation bias,” which leads in-
dividuals to seek out and prefer information that confirms their hy-
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potheses.263  As prosecutors review a suspect’s file, the confirmation 
bias would drive them to only look for evidence that supports that sus-
pect’s guilt.264 Another well-recognized cognitive bias is “selective in-
formation processing” —when an individual overvalues information 
confirming a pre-existing belief and undervalues evidence contrary to 
that belief.265 Thus, once prosecutors form an opinion that the defen-
dant is guilty, they will value evidence supporting their pre-existing 
opinion more heavily than evidence contradicting that opinion. Due to 
selective information processing, the prosecutor will readily credit any 
new evidence supporting a theory of the defendant’s guilt, while un-
dervaluing or ignoring evidence indicating that the defendant is inno-
cent.266 
 Furthermore, people also suffer from a cognitive bias known as 
"reactive devaluation," a tendency to give little weight to information 
provided by a disliked individual.267 Assuming that a prosecutor dislikes 
a defendant, or the acts that the defendant has allegedly committed, 
reactive devaluation means that the prosecutor is likely to disregard 
exculpatory evidence provided by the defendant. 
 A final cognitive bias is “belief perseverance,” which suggests that a 
prosecutor, believing a defendant to be guilty, will cling to that belief 
despite evidence to the contrary.268 In sum, all of these cognitive biases 
may contribute to prosecutors overcharging defendants and making 
high initial plea offers.269 
 In addition to cognitive biases, the prosecutor’s role in the crimi-
nal justice system also contributes to their biased anchors. For example, 
studies have highlighted that, due to heavy caseloads, screening cases to 
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avoid trial is one of the most critical functions of any prosecutor.270 Fur-
thermore, to secure a desirable plea agreement, it is well established 
that prosecutors will resort to deliberately overcharging a defendant.271 
When plea discounts have no limits, as is often the case, prosecutors 
will typically overcharge defendants simply because it gives them lever-
age at the bargaining table.272 
 Prosecutors specifically engage in both vertical and horizontal 
overcharging.273 Prosecutors horizontally overcharge by padding 
charges against the defendant “with nonoverlapping counts of a similar 
offense type, or with multiple counts of the same offense type, where 
the underlying criminal conduct sought to be punished is adequately 
penalized by a single count.”274 Vertical overcharging is simpler, with 
the prosecutor merely charging an offense greater than what the evi-
dence reasonably supports.275 Prosecutors will present a potential plea 
deal as a way for defendants to minimize losses, and then they will often 
make high initial plea offers.276 The prosecutor’s hope is that the de-
fendant will anchor on the offer, resulting in a plea bargain that might 
have been rejected in the absence of overcharging, and an inflated ini-
tial plea offer.277 
C. Problem Two: Underadjustment 
 As described above, people typically do not adjust from their an-
chors much because the anchor has such a substantial effect on all fu-
ture adjustments.278 The prosecutor, rather than defense counsel, al-
most always makes the initial offer during plea discussions, resulting in 
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high initial offers.279 Thus, if criminal defendants are like the subjects 
in the aforementioned studies, the plea bargains that most defendants 
accept are inordinately influenced by prosecutors’ self-serving and bi-
ased initial offers. 
 Exacerbating the underadjustment problem in plea negotiations is 
the belief that the average criminal defendant underadjusts more than 
the average person. Recall that eighty percent of criminal defendants 
are represented by public defenders who are less likely to find viable 
defenses and presumably more likely to accept plea offers.280 These fac-
tors suggest that a criminal defendant is more likely to underadjust 
than the average person as well as an average litigant with better re-
sources and representation. 
 Another factor that may exacerbate the degree to which criminal 
defendants underadjust is a phenomenon known as the “trial penalty,” 
a de facto penalty that judges impose at sentencing on defendants “with 
the temerity to go to trial.”281 There is significant support for the exis-
tence of the trial penalty, and studies have shown that there are sub-
stantial differences in the sentences imposed after jury trials compared 
to sentences imposed after guilty pleas.282 For instance, in a study of 
criminal sentences for different types of offenses in five states, re-
searchers found that cases reaching a jury trial have a more severe av-
erage penalty than cases with guilty pleas.283 In another study, sentences 
following jury trials were found to be 44.5 months longer than those 
following guilty pleas (after controlling for a number of factors).284 In-
deed, one of the main reasons that the vast majority of jurisdictions 
preclude judges from participating in plea discussions (and the reason 
that Connecticut precludes plea-participating judges from presiding 
over defendants’ trials if plea negotiations fail) is the fear that these 
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judges would penalize non-pleading defendants.285 Because defendants 
are the ones who will suffer the consequences of the trial penalty if a 
deal is not reached, it is easy to see why they would underadjust rather 
than vigorously negotiate. 
D. Problem Three: Even Arbitrary, Random, or Irrelevant Numbers Can Serve 
as Anchors and Distort Calculations 
 The third main problem with the anchoring effect also manifests 
itself in criminal plea negotiations.286 Most people are risk averse, and 
although guilty defendants are likely to be less risk averse than inno-
cent defendants,287 it is easy to see how even a guilty but overcharged 
defendant could “plausibly distrust adjudication’s capacity to vindicate 
false charges.”288 These defendants would thus “sensibly accede to inac-
curate pleas to avoid the risk of graver consequences.”289 Similar to the 
subjects who awarded the plaintiff more when the plaintiff asked for an 
outlandish $1 billion, it is easy to see how a defendant who recklessly 
killed a victim could agree to plea guilty to second degree murder 
when the prosecutor originally charged him with capital murder.290 
E. How Judicial Participation in Plea Discussions Could Reduce  
the Anchoring Effect 
 As noted, studies have found that when researchers present sub-
jects with a hypothetical case and only provide them with the plaintiff’s 
request for damages, the subjects anchor on that request and damages 
awards increase with the plaintiff’s request.291 Conversely, when re-
searchers present subjects with damages requests by both the plaintiff 
and the defendant, the anchoring effect is reduced or eliminated. In 
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one study, researchers read 360 undergraduate students a case sum-
mary which was adapted from an actual case as follows: 
[T]he defendant shipping company was responsible for a fall 
by the plaintiff, a 33-year-old male longshoreman. The sum-
mary described the plaintiff’s injuries, including injured ten-
dons and cartilage in one knee and a herniated disc. The 
plaintiff also had several attacks of temporary paralysis that 
caused him to collapse and, on one occasion, to break his 
arm. He developed complications following his second ar-
throscopic surgery, causing him to be bedridden and to need 
a wheelchair for 6 months. The plaintiff’s injuries caused se-
vere depression for which he received psychiatric treatment. 
His doctors testified that his chronic back pain and occasional 
pain and swelling in his knee probably would worsen as he 
aged. The summary stated that although the plaintiff found 
desk work at similar pay, he was unable to continue working 
outdoors and missed the physical labor.292 
 The researchers told the subjects that a prior jury had already 
found the defendant responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries and had 
awarded damages for medical expenses and lost earnings; the subjects 
merely needed to award damages for pain and suffering.293 The sub-
jects had to decide the minimum and maximum award that they 
thought would be reasonable and the amount of damages to award.294 
The variable was the amount of damages for pain and suffering re-
quested by the plaintiff and the defendant.295 
 In the “low anchor” condition, where subjects were told that the 
plaintiff requested $750,000 in damages and that the defendant made 
no request, the subjects listed an average minimum reasonable award 
of $351,250, an average maximum reasonable award of $1,058,626, and 
an average award of $609,866.296 Subjects who were told that the de-
fendant countered the plaintiff’s $750,000 request with a request that 
he be ordered to pay only $25,000 in damages, listed an average mini-
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mum reasonable award of $187,250, an average maximum reasonable 
award of $625,653, and an average award of $433,594.297 
 In the “medium anchor” condition, subjects who were told that the 
plaintiff made a request for $1.5 million in damages, with no corre-
sponding defense request, listed an average minimum reasonable award 
of $490,484, an average maximum reasonable award of  $1,267,903, and 
an average award of $867,419.298 Subjects who were told that the defen-
dant countered the plaintiff’s request with a $25,000 damages request 
averaged a $371,033 minimum, $1,101,684 maximum, and $662,129 
average award.299 
 In the “high anchor” condition, subjects who were informed that 
the plaintiff asked for $5 million in damages and that the defendant 
made no damages request, listed average minimums and maximums of 
$787,452 and $3,313,000, and $1,929,129 as an average award.300 Mean-
while, subjects informed that the plaintiff’s request was accompanied by 
a defense request of $25,000 listed an average minimum and maximum 
of $552,679 and $2,322,321, and an average award of $1,264,286.301 
 Unsurprisingly, the average minimum and maximum awards that 
subjects thought were reasonable increased as the plaintiff’s request for 
damages increased.302 Nevertheless, when the defendant countered 
with a damages request, both the minimum and maximum reasonable 
awards were substantially less than when the defendant offered no re-
buttal amount.303 Also unsurprisingly, as the plaintiff’s request in-
creased, the average award also increased.304 Once again, however, the 
average awards were higher when a rebuttal amount was not speci-
fied.305 
 Researchers in another study found similar results. In this study, 
researchers selected 122 jurors waiting to be called for voir dire to par-
ticipate in a study.306 The researchers gave the subjects a summary of 
the evidence presented in an age discrimination lawsuit.307 Subjects 
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were placed in four different groups.308 Subjects in one condition (the 
“no award, no expert” condition) were exposed to neither any sug-
gested awards during closing arguments nor any expert witness testi-
mony.309 Subjects in a second condition (the “award, no expert” condi-
tion) heard that the plaintiff’s attorney requested $719,354 in damages 
for lost wages and benefits, whereas defense counsel countered that the 
defendant should be ordered to pay only $321,000.310 In a third condi-
tion (the “award, plaintiff’s expert” condition), subjects learned the 
same information as the subjects in the second condition, but they also 
heard testimony from the plaintiff’s expert economist explaining how 
he arrived at the $719,354 figure.311 Finally, subjects in a fourth condi-
tion (the “award, both experts” condition) were exposed to the same 
information as subjects in the third condition, but they also heard tes-
timony from the defendant’s expert explaining the basis for his 
$321,000 figure.312 
 The researchers had the subjects in each group complete prede-
liberation questionnaires and then deliberate for up to forty-five min-
utes, or until they reached a verdict.313 Subjects in group one awarded 
the plaintiff an average of $520,000 in lost wages and benefits, whereas 
group two subjects awarded an average of $566,000.314 Subjects in 
group three, who heard expert testimony from the plaintiff’s expert, 
but not the defendant’s expert, awarded the plaintiff an average of 
$719,000 in damages, i.e., nearly the same amount suggested by the 
plaintiff’s expert.315 Conversely, subjects in group four, who heard ex-
pert testimony from both sides, awarded the plaintiff an average of 
$529,000 in damages, the median between the expert’s respective pro-
posals.316 
 Recall Professor Bibas’s hypothetical, illustrating how the anchor-
ing effect might influence plea-bargaining negotiations: The professor 
envisions that under circumstances in which a prosecutor makes a high 
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initial offer of twenty years’ incarceration—achieved by piling on every 
possible enhancement—the defendant will reject this opening offer, 
but will anchor on the twenty-year proposal.317 Although the defendant 
will reject the prosecutor’s next offer of fifteen years’ imprisonment, he 
will later accept the prosecutor’s final offer of twelve years’ incarcera-
tion.318 Based upon the aforementioned studies—illustrating the phe-
nomenon of underadjustment and the weight given to arbitrary an-
chors by jurors and judges—Professor Bibas’s hypothetical appears to 
reach a plausible result.319 
 Alternatively, this hypothetical would end differently if it were set 
in a jurisdiction where the judge could be involved in plea discus-
sions—such as Florida or Connecticut. Plea negotiations in these juris-
dictions would instead begin with a prosecutor presenting his case to 
the judge and making a request for twenty years’ imprisonment.320 De-
fense counsel would then present his case and request.321 Assuming 
that the enhancements piled on by the prosecutor lacked evidentiary 
or factual support, defense counsel’s request would likely be signifi-
cantly lower—perhaps five years’ incarceration. 
 After considering both sides, the judge would then communicate 
his expected post-plea sentence.322 For example, the judge could first 
communicate the expected sentence in the form of a fixed sentence.323 
Recall that studies have shown how judges are subject to the same an-
choring effect as other research subjects.324 As a result, the previous two 
studies suggest that the judge would likely communicate an expected 
sentence somewhere between the prosecutor and defense counsel’s 
requests. 
  A comparison with the civil context is telling. In 2010, Professor 
Geoffrey P. Miller proposed that a judge in a civil case be allowed to 
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issue a preliminary judgment.325 According to Professor Miller, the an-
choring effect hinders civil negotiations because the parties “make ex-
treme demands in hopes of anchoring discussions at a favorable fig-
ure.”326 If, on the other hand, judges, were able to make preliminary 
judgments, those judgments themselves would as the anchors, and in 
turn, reduce the anchoring effect.327 
 Moreover, Miller argued that “[b]ecause preliminary judgments 
[would be] made by a judge after a provisional review of the evidence, 
. . . they offer litigants the satisfaction of a formal adjudication and thus 
potentially enhance their willingness to accept the outcome as legiti-
mate and binding.”328 Furthermore, preliminary judgments would be 
publicly announced and thus “provide valuable information to third 
parties to guide future conduct.”329 Finally, Miller claimed that al-
though reactive devaluation likely causes many civil parties to ignore 
their opponents’ arguments, the same devaluation is unlikely to occur 
when a judge renders a preliminary ruling.330 There is no adversarial 
relationship between a judge and the party, and the judge is only inter-
ested in a fair and speedy resolution of the matter.331 
 The anchoring effect suggests that these same results would apply 
if a judge communicates a fixed sentence after both sides present their 
cases during a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. In a criminal case, 
the anchor would be the judge’s fixed sentence suggestion of ten years’ 
                                                                                                                      
325 Miller, supra note 267267, at 167. A preliminary judgment is: 
[A] tentative assessment of the merits of a case or any part of a case, based on 
the same sorts of information that the courts already consider on motions for 
summary judgment. The difference between a preliminary judgment and a 
summary judgment is that the court, in a preliminary judgment, would not be 
limited to deciding issues with which no reasonable jury could disagree. In-
stead the court would provide its own provisional judgment on the merits of 
the case based on the information provided by the parties. A preliminary 
judgment, once given, would convert into a final judgment after the expira-
tion of a reasonable period of time—say, thirty days. Any party against whom 
a preliminary judgment is issued, however, would have the right to object 
prior to the expiration of the period (with or without explanation), in which 
case the judgment would be vacated and the case would proceed according to 
ordinary rules of procedure. 
Id. at 167–68. 
326 Id. at 179 (citing Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 203, at 18–19). It has been noted 
that offering extreme opening offers is a successful litigation strategy. Id. at 176 n.48. 
327 Id. at 179. 
328 Id. at 168. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 179. 
331 Miller, supra note 267, at 179. 
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incarceration, not the prosecutor’s opening offer of twenty years. By 
having a neutral judge communicate a fixed sentence, the prosecutor 
and defendant would more easily agree upon a plea bargain. Indeed, 
Connecticut prosecutors and defense attorneys broadly agree that hav-
ing a neutral third party creates a fairer negotiation, and a judge makes 
each party more amenable to agreement and less likely to disturb that 
resolution through appeal.332 Moreover, although plea conferences 
with judges are not officially recorded in Connecticut, they are re-
corded in Florida and can provide valuable information to future 
prosecutors and defendants about what judges think are appropriate 
plea bargain sentences.333 Finally, coming from a neutral judge, a fixed 
sentence recommendation should help the prosecutor overcome some 
of the aforementioned cognitive biases, like reactive devaluation.334 A 
preliminary judicial recommendation should also have the same effect 
on defendants. As the Connecticut interviewees noted, “the judge’s in-
volvement may be valuable to defendants who would refuse a reason-
able bargain simply because they mistrust the prosecutor, yet would ac-
cept the same offer if it came from the judge.”335 
 To further mitigate the anchoring effect, judges could communi-
cate the expected sentence in the form of a sentence range or a sen-
tencing cap.336 Judges could communicate a range by indicating that 
they would approve of a plea deal under which the defendant’s sen-
tence fell within a certain span of years. Likewise, judges could com-
municate a sentencing cap by indicating what the maximum acceptable 
sentence under a plea bargain would be.337 Studies indicate that such 
actions by a judge would mitigate the anchoring effect. 
 For example, in one study, researchers gave forty male Vanderbilt 
University students a set of written instructions. The instructions pro-
vided the following scenario to each subject: 
[He] and the other subject were to take the role of two auto-
mobile dealers. One of the dealers, Colonial Motors, had a 
customer for a “Mongoose” sedan, but did not have the car on 
his lot. The other dealer, Tower Automobile Company, had 
                                                                                                                      
332 Turner, supra note 24, at 254–55. 
333 See id. at 241–42. 
334 See Miller, supra note 267, at 178 (citing Ross & Stillinger, supra note 267, at 394–95) 
(describing reactive devaluation as a cognitive bias that causes parties to give insufficient 
weight to the opinions of those they dislike). 
335 Turner, supra note 24, at 254. 
336 See id. at 242. 
337 See id. 
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just such a car. The task for the subjects as dealers was to ar-
range a contract whereby Tower sold Colonial the sedan, so 
that Colonial could then sell it to the customer. Colonial’s task 
was to submit bids to Tower for the price he was willing to pay 
for the car. Tower could accept a bid or make a counterbid. 
Tower’s profit was the difference between the cost of the car 
to him ($2500) and what Colonial would pay him for the 
automobile. Colonial’s profit was the difference between what 
the customer would pay for the car and what he had to pay 
Tower.338 
In reality, the researchers designated each subject a Tower automobile 
dealer—no subjects represented Colonial Motors.339 Researchers gave 
each subject an initial bid from a fictional Colonial automobile dealer, 
after which the parties exchanged a series of bids and counterbids until 
an agreement was reached.340 The counterbids were determined ac-
cording to a bid schedule constructed on the initial basis of Colonial 
selling the car for $3500, with Colonial profiting on the difference be-
tween $3500 and the amount it paid Tower for the car.341 Under each 
condition, each successive bid after Colonial’s initial bid led to a 10% 
decrease in the company’s profit.342 
 There were two variables: the amount of Colonial’s opening bid 
and the amount of information given to the subjects.343 In the unfavor-
able-incompletely informed condition, researchers gave subjects an ini-
tial bid by Colonial of $2615 and merely told them that the cost of the 
car was $2500.344 Subjects in the unfavorable-completely informed con-
dition were treated in the same way, except that the researcher also told 
them that Colonial’s customer would pay $3500 for the car.345 In the 
favorable-incompletely informed condition, researchers gave subjects a 
first bid of $3050 and only told them the $2500 cost of the car.346 Re-
                                                                                                                      
338 Robert M. Liebert et al., The Effects of Information and Magnitude of Initial Offer on In-
terpersonal Negotiation, 4 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 431, 434–35 (1968). 
339 Id. at 435. 
340 See id. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. 
343 Id. These two variables were combined to create four conditions: (1) unfavorable-
incompletely informed condition; (2) unfavorable-completely informed condition; (3) 
favorable-incompletely informed condition; and (4) favorable-completely informed condi-
tion. Id. 
344 Liebert et al., supra note 338, at 435. 
345 Id. 
346 Id. 
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searchers treated subjects in the favorable-completely informed condi-
tion the same, except that they also told them that the Colonial cus-
tomer would pay $3500.347 
 The researchers hypothesized that uninformed bargainers, when 
faced with an unfavorable opening offer from an opponent, would ac-
cept a contract of lower value than they would when faced with a favor-
able opening offer. The contract value of informed bargainers, on the 
other hand, would not be affected by the opponent’s first bid.348 The 
results proved this hypothesis to be accurate.349 In the unfavorable-
incompletely informed condition, subjects reached an average contract 
price under which they profited by $525.70, whereas subjects in the fa-
vorable-incompletely informed condition profited by an average of 
$765.50.350 In contrast, subjects in the unfavorable-completely in-
formed condition achieved an average profit of $628, whereas subjects 
in the favorable-completely informed condition procured $646.50 as an 
average profit.351 
 In other words, the uninformed subjects anchored on their oppo-
nent’s first bid. If the first bid was unfavorable to them, they would ac-
cept an unfavorable contract, and if the first bid was more favorable to 
them, they would accept a more favorable contract.352 Conversely, the 
informed bargainers did not anchor on the opponent’s first bid be-
cause that value never impacted the final contract value.353 
 In jurisdictions in which judges are not involved in plea negotia-
tions, most defendants are like the subjects in the unfavorable-
incompletely informed condition: The prosecutor offers the typical 
defendant a high initial plea offer, and the defendant has no knowl-
edge of (1) how much of a sentencing discount the prosecutor would 
offer if push came to shove; or (2) what type of sentence a judge would 
accept. As a result, defendants in these jurisdictions likely accept unfa-
vorable plea bargains based upon the anchoring effect. 
 In jurisdictions like Florida and Connecticut, where judges are in-
volved in plea discussions, most defendants are like the subjects in the 
unfavorable-completely informed condition. The prosecutor still makes 
a high initial plea “offer” in the form of a sentencing demand to the 
                                                                                                                      
347 Id. 
348 Id. at 436. 
349 Id. 
350 Liebert et al., supra note 338, at 436. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 438. 
353 Id. 
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judge.354 Defense counsel then makes a lower sentencing demand to 
the judge, who can then respond to the sentencing demands with a 
sentence cap or range. Those figures will presumably fall somewhere 
between the two demands. In such cases, the fact that the prosecutor 
made a high, rather than a low, initial offer should not influence the 
nature of the plea bargain reached by the parties. Instead, like the in-
formed bargainers in the previous study, defendants should be able to 
make decisions based upon their knowledge of the maximum (and 
sometimes minimum) sentence that the judge would accept, making 
the nature of the prosecutor’s initial offer irrelevant, or at least less 
relevant. 
V. Judicial Participation Ameliorates Other Plea-Bargaining 
Problems 
 Judicial participation in plea bargaining can ameliorate many of 
the problems facing parties in plea negotiations. Judicial involvement 
can eliminate the caveat accused approach to Federal Rule of Evidence 
410 and restore a caveat prosecutor approach.355 In addition, judges 
would also be able to explain to defendants the effects of prosecution-
sought waivers.356 Furthermore, judges could use their participation to 
ensure crisis-ridden public defenders adequately protect the rights of 
their clients.357 Finally, judicial involvement in plea bargaining would 
put teeth back into the judicial review of plea agreements required by 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.358 
A. Eliminating Caveat Accused 
 Rule 410(a)(4) deems a defendant’s statements inadmissible if 
they were “made during plea discussions with an attorney for the 
prosecuting authority.”359 Despite the fact that the original intent was 
for this burden of proof to be placed on the prosecutor, courts have 
overwhelmingly adopted a caveat accused approach, where the burden is 
placed on the defendant to prove that his statements were protected by 
this Rule.360 
                                                                                                                      
354 See Taslitz, supra note 21, at 21. 
355 See infra notes 359–367 and accompanying text. 
356 See infra notes 268–376 and accompanying text. 
357 See infra notes 377–388 and accompanying text. 
358 See infra notes 389–394 and accompanying text. 
359 Fed. R. Evid. 410; see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
360 See Miller, supra note 33, at 232–34. 
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 One response to this situation would be to change the way that 
courts approach plea bargaining so that the burden is placed back on 
the prosecution—as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in-
tended in 1976 in United States v. Robertson.361 Critics, of course, could 
respond that reintroducing a caveat prosecutor approach would hamper 
criminal prosecutions and too easily allow defendants to insulate their 
statements from the eyes and ears of jurors. 
 A more sensible approach, then, would be to permit judicial par-
ticipation in the early stages of plea bargaining, allowing for courts to 
better protect the interests of both defendants and prosecutors. Con-
sider again the Connecticut and Florida experiences. In Connecticut, 
judges become involved in plea discussions during pretrial conferences, 
with both sides presenting summaries of the case when they first meet 
the judge.362 Similarly, in Florida, judges typically become involved with 
plea bargaining during the pretrial conferences, with plea discussions 
occurring as “a matter of course.”363 Given the concern of defendants 
and defense counsel about whether a conversation with the prosecutor 
will constitute a “plea discussion” covered by Rule 410, these jurisdic-
tions offer a partial solution: defendants can simply wait for the pretrial 
hearings, where such discussions take place as a matter of course before 
the judge.364 At these conferences, defendants can speak with impunity, 
knowing that their statements are being made during formal “plea dis-
cussions.” 
 Some might argue that prosecutors prefer the status quo of a ca-
veat accused approach and would therefore object to increased judicial 
participation. Nevertheless, one study reveals that prosecutors would 
not likely object to these changes.365 For example, in Connecticut, al-
though the defense and the prosecution have the option to enter plea 
negotiations without a judge, they typically prefer judicial participa-
tion.366 Indeed, “[i]n some districts, virtually all plea negotiations are 
conducted in the judge’s chambers.”367 
                                                                                                                      
361 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text; see also 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 n.21 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (describing the caveat prosecutor approach). 
362 See Turner, supra note 24, at 249. 
363 See id. at 240–42. 
364 See id. at 240–42, 249. 
365 Id. at 248. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
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B. The Ability of Judges to Explain Waivers to Defendants 
 Even slight differences in language in the “Queen for a Day” 
agreements and appeals waivers can lead to widely different and unex-
pected results.368 Currently, in most jurisdictions, there is no way for the 
parties to get information from the judge regarding a “Queen for a 
Day” agreement. Judges cannot become involved with the plea-
bargaining process until the plea hearing, at which point the defendant 
would have already signed the waiver.369 If the defendant signed an ap-
peal waiver, the judge may engage the defendant in an explicit discus-
sion regarding the waiver at the plea hearing.  Many courts, however, 
have found that such a discussion is not required.370 Moreover, even if 
two agreements have identical language, they might produce very dif-
ferent results in different jurisdictions.371 For example, some courts 
have only approved of rebuttal waivers, whereas other courts have ap-
proved of case-in-chief waivers.372 Furthermore, some courts have ap-
                                                                                                                      
368 See supra notes 106–126 and accompanying text (illustrating how differences in 
waiver language have caused courts to reach divergent results). 
369 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). 
370 See, e.g., United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871–72 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Al-
though it might have been preferable for the court to have conducted a colloquy with 
Michelsen regarding his waiver of appeal, such a dialogue is not a prerequisite for a valid 
waiver of the right to appeal.”); United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(“We hold, therefore, that when the record of the Rule 11 hearing clearly indicates that a 
defendant has read and understands his plea agreement, and that he raised no question 
regarding a waiver-of-appeal provision, the defendant will be held to the bargain to which 
he agreed, regardless of whether the court specifically admonished him concerning the 
waiver of appeal.”); United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 38 F.3d 394, 395 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting the argument that the judge must advise the defendant of the waiver at the 
guilty-plea hearing). But see, e.g., United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 423, 496 (1994) (holding 
that “a waiver is not knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically 
question the defendant concerning the waiver provision of the plea agreement during the 
Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise under-
stand the full significance of the waiver”); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 
(11th Cir. 1993) (same). 
371 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995); United States v. Parra, 
302 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 n.1, 230–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); King & O’Neill, supra note 118, at 
211. 
372 See, e.g., United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 288–90 (5th Cir. 2009) (approving 
case-in-chief waivers); United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008) (approv-
ing rebuttal waivers); United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2004) (approv-
ing rebuttal waivers); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 406–08 (9th Cir. 2002) (approv-
ing rebuttal waivers); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909–11 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(approving case-in-chief waivers); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1024–26 (7th Cir. 
1998) (approving rebuttal waivers); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1320–22 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (approving case-in-chief waivers). 
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proved of rebuttal waivers, but only in unpublished opinions.373 Courts 
have also split over several aspects of appeals waivers, such as whether 
defendants can waive claims for ineffective assistance of counsel.374 
 In other words, when a defendant signs any of these waivers, he 
often does not know exactly what he is waiving. Furthermore, even if 
the defendant or defense counsel knows that terms in these waivers can 
be negotiated, they would not necessarily know whether the judge 
would treat any prosecutorial concessions as meaningful. 
 The ambiguity inherent to these waivers is also a concern for the 
prosecutor. If the defendant signs a case-in-chief waiver, most jurisdic-
tions require the prosecutor to convince the judge that the waiver is 
constitutionally permissible.375 Additionally, the prosecutor desiring to 
foreclose most avenues of appeal by having the defendant sign an ap-
peal waiver must take the large risk of leaving an appeal open unless 
the judge hearing the case has previously ruled favorably on a waiver 
with the same language.376 
 When judges are involved in plea discussions, these concerns at 
least partially dissipate. If the parties want to know the efficacy of a 
waiver, they merely need to ask the judge. Judges can then inform both 
sides whether they will enforce the subject waiver, and what effect it will 
have on trial or subsequent appeals. 
C. Diminishing the Effects of the Public Defender Crisis 
 Judicial participation in the plea-bargaining process can also work 
to minimize the negative effects of the public defender system. One 
landmark study revealed that public defenders, who represent the vast 
majority of criminal defendants, are typically less capable than their 
                                                                                                                      
373 See, e.g., United States v. Artis, 261 F. App’x 176, 177–79 (11th Cir. 2008) (reasoning 
that Mezzanatto allows rebuttal waivers); United States v. Fifer, 206 F. App’x 502, 509–10 
(6th Cir. 2006) (enforcing a rebuttal waiver). 
374 Compare Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Under 
these circumstances, the sentence-appeal waiver precludes a § 2255 claims [sic] based on 
ineffective assistance at sentencing.”), with United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“The plea agreement entered into by the government and Pruitt did not waive 
Pruitt’s right to bring a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
375 See United States v. Mergen, No. 06-CR-352 (NGG), 2010 WL 395974, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2010). In the  Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, this extra 
step is not necessary. See, e.g., Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 288–90 (ruling there was no reason not 
to enforce case-in-chief waivers); Young, 223 F.3d at 909–11 (concluding that Mezzanatto 
covered a case-in-chief waiver); Burch, 156 F.3d at 1320–22 (reasoning there is no rationale 
for not extending Mezzanatto to case-in-chief waivers). 
376 See supra notes 118–129 and accompanying text (illustrating how differences in 
waiver language have caused courts to reach divergent results). 
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privately paid counterparts,377 and consequently more likely to accept a 
prosecutor’s plea offer.378 Early judicial participation, therefore, can be 
an important brake on the “McJustice” delivered by plea bargain as-
sembly lines.379 
 For example, prosecutors and defense attorneys in Connecticut 
agreed that actively involved, impartial third parties contributed to the 
fairness of plea negotiations.380 Specifically, interviewees indicated that, 
“[a]s an impartial mediator, the judge can . . . better ensure that the 
plea adequately reflects the facts of the case, even where lawyers fail in 
their representation.”381 A judge can reject a plea bargain, for instance, 
when it is clear that a defendant does not understand the plea, or when 
incompetent and overworked attorneys instruct defendants to enter 
into plea bargains too early in the process.382 One public defender in-
terviewee responded “that even pro-prosecutor judges try to help inex-
perienced attorneys make sure that their client will not be harmed.”383 
The judge might also encourage defense counsel to consider other op-
tions besides imprisonment.384 
 Prosecutors concur that early judicial involvement in plea bargain-
ing makes the process fairer because both sides gain from the proc-
ess.385 A judge can mediate the often unreasonable starting positions of 
prosecutors and defendants.386 With a judge present, prosecutors are 
not as likely to try to intimidate the defendant during plea bargaining, 
nor are they as likely to acquiesce to defendants in an effort to speedily 
resolve the case.387 Moreover, if a prosecutor’s incompetence distorts 
the bargaining process, a judge may refuse to accommodate the prose-
cutor’s position.388 
                                                                                                                      
377 See Emmelman, supra note 131, at 952 (illustrating that criminal defendants “may 
be less likely to find viable defenses than attorneys who represent wealthy clients with 
greater access to resources”). 
378 Lester, supra note 134, at 586 n.96. 
379 Appleman, supra note 137, at 769. 
380 Turner, supra note 24, at 254. 
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383 Id. at 255 n.348. 
384 Id. at 254. 
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D. Putting the Teeth Back in Plea Review 
 As noted, if a defendant reaches a plea agreement with the prose-
cutor, a defendant is only entitled to a plea hearing, where a judge con-
firms that the plea is “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”389 Because 
judges are not involved with plea negotiations until the plea hearing, 
after-the-fact review is difficult.390 At this stage, neither the judge nor the 
parties have much interest in disturbing the agreement, and the 
judge—with no prior exposure to the plea-bargaining process—typically 
just engages in “a five-minute interview of the person, under Rule 11, 
getting a kind of half-hearted, scripted confession as part of the guilty 
plea process.”391 
 In jurisdictions that allow judicial participation in plea discussions, 
the situation is markedly different. Judges can explain the plea-
bargaining process to defendants, reducing the chance that a plea bar-
gain is unknowing or unintelligent. Moreover, when a judge partici-
pates in plea discussions, it gives the judge the ability to determine 
whether the plea was voluntary or coerced and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, allows the defendant to perceive the final plea deal as fair.392 Ac-
cording to one Florida judge: 
[Judicial involvement in the plea negotiations] can possibly 
help with determining whether the plea is voluntary, knowing, 
or whether there is a factual basis . . . . The colloquy is proba-
bly sufficient for that, but it helps somewhat to be involved in 
advance because the defendant sees the court as somewhat 
less hostile than the prosecutor. So the defendant is more 
likely to believe it is a fair deal.393 
In turn, defendants in these jurisdictions are not as likely to file ap-
peals.394 
VI. The Objections to Judicial Involvement in Plea Discussions 
Are Overstated and Can Be Avoided 
 Critics raise three general objections to judicial involvement in 
plea discussions: (1) guarding against coerced guilty pleas; (2) preserv-
                                                                                                                      
389 O’Sullivan, supra note 140, at 361. 
390 See Turner, supra note 24, at 212. 
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ing judicial neutrality; and (3) preserving the court as a neutral arbi-
ter.395 Nevertheless, these three concerns are overstated and can be 
avoided.396 Additional critiques of judicial involvement in plea bargain-
ing, such as concerns about judicial resources and crime, are similarly 
overstated.397 
A. The Three Principal Interests Served by the Ban on Judicial Participation 
 Courts have generally viewed Rule 11(c)(1)’s proscription on judi-
cial involvement in plea discussions as advancing three principal inter-
ests.398 First, courts claim that the proscription “guards against ‘the 
high and unacceptable risk of coercing a defendant’ to enter into an 
involuntary guilty plea.”399 According to courts, the fear is that if a 
judge were involved in plea discussions, the defendant would believe 
that the judge desired a plea bargain and thus would accept one rather 
than risk being punished by the judge for taking his chances at trial.400 
 A second interest allegedly served by prohibiting judges from par-
ticipating in plea discussions is the interest of preserving judicial neu-
trality.401 Courts fear that a judge involved in plea discussions “may feel 
personally involved, and thus, resent the defendant’s rejection of his 
advice.”402 Courts have also claimed that judicial involvement during 
plea discussions may make it difficult for judges to objectively assess the 
voluntariness of pleas.403 
 The third interest that the ban on judicial participation during 
plea discussions allegedly furthers is preserving the court’s reputation 
as a neutral arbiter.404 Courts fear that if judges were involved in plea 
discussions, a defendant would view judges as adversaries, instead of 
guarantors of the administration of justice.405 According to courts, “the 
‘interests of justice are best served if the judge remains aloof from all 
discussions preliminary to the determination of guilt or innocence so 
                                                                                                                      
395 See infra notes 398–406 and accompanying text. 
396 See infra notes 407–417 and accompanying text. 
397 See infra notes 418–422 and accompanying text. 
398 United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cannady, 
283 F.3d 641, 644–45 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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that his impartiality and objectivity shall not be open to any ques-
tion.’”406 
B. Why These Concerns Are Overstated 
 The concerns associated with judicial participation in plea bargain-
ing are overstated and can be avoided. Of course, it may very well be 
true that if a judge were involved in plea discussions, a defendant would 
feel coerced into accepting a plea bargain rather than face the wrath of 
a vengeful judge at trial.407 This fear, however, already exists even in the 
absence of judicial participation. As noted, it is well established that 
there is a phenomenon known as the “trial penalty,” which is a de facto 
penalty that judges impose at sentencing “on those defendants with the 
temerity to go to trial.”408 Perhaps more importantly, regardless of 
whether the trial penalty actually exists, the majority of defendants be-
lieve that it does, which “drives the perceived need to plead guilty.”409 
 Given these realities, the fear that judicial participation in plea dis-
cussions would coerce defendants into plea bargains or cause judges to 
punish noncompliant defendants is overstated. These fears already ex-
ist in jurisdictions that do not allow judicial participation in plea discus-
sions. Judicial participation would, at worst, only incrementally cause 
more harm. Moreover, this fear is based on the presumption that 
judges assume that obstinate defendants prevent the achievement of 
plea bargains. If judges were involved in plea discussions, however, they 
would have firsthand knowledge of whether it was the defendant or the 
prosecutor’s unreasonableness in the negotiation that prevented the 
sides from making a deal. 
 Furthermore, if jurisdictions were to allow judicial participation in 
plea discussions, they could ensure that such participation would not 
result in a trial penalty any steeper than the penalty that exists in juris-
dictions that prohibit such participation. In Connecticut, if the sides do 
not reach a plea agreement after plea discussions, a judge different 
from the one involved in plea negotiations must conduct the subse-
quent trial.410 The same is true for motions to suppress.411 This proce-
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dure is intended to ensure that the judge involved in the plea negotia-
tions will play no role in the ensuing trial, including the imposition of 
sentence upon conviction.412 
 Thus, jurisdictions could prevent any increased trial penalty by 
adopting Connecticut’s procedure. That said, if jurisdictions adopted 
this procedure, they would lose the benefit gained by having a judge 
with firsthand knowledge of plea discussions when ruling on whether 
the defendant’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.413 Of 
course, courts precluding judicial participation in plea discussions have 
done so in part based upon the fear that judicial involvement during 
plea discussions may make it difficult for judges objectively to assess the 
voluntariness of pleas.414 If these jurisdictions are correct, this fear 
should not manifest itself if the judge assessing the voluntariness of a 
defendant’s plea is not the same judge who participated in plea discus-
sions. 
 The fear that judicial participation in plea discussions would stifle 
the impression of judges as neutral arbiters  also appears ill-founded. 
Instead, there was broad agreement among Connecticut prosecutors 
and defense attorneys that actively involved, impartial third parties con-
tributed to the fairness of plea negotiations.415 Rather than claiming 
that judges involved in plea discussions coerce defendants into plead-
ing guilty, interviewees indicated that judges can be impartial mediators 
who, when lawyers fail in representing their clients, ensure that the 
facts of the case are adequately reflected in the plea.416 Judges may re-
fuse to honor a plea bargain if, in their view, the defendant had incom-
petent representation.417 
C. Addressing Other Possible Interests Served by the Ban  
on Judicial Participation 
 There seem to be two other major defenses of the proscription on 
judicial participation in plea discussions. One is that judicial participa-
tion would decrease the number of plea bargains reached and increase 
the number of criminal cases reaching trial—a result that would run 
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counter to the congressional intent of promoting plea bargains.418 Cur-
rently, more than ninety percent of all criminal cases in this country are 
resolved by plea bargains.419 Yet Florida’s rate is even higher, at ninety-
six percent.420 It seems unlikely, therefore, that judicial participation in 
plea discussions would decrease the percentage of cases resolved by 
plea discussions. Indeed, Connecticut prosecutors and defense attor-
neys believed the judicial participation made the parties more amena-
ble to agreement early in the process and less likely to appeal after 
trial.421 
 These responses undermine the second additional defense of the 
proscription on judicial participation, which is that judicial participa-
tion would strain judicial resources. It is of course true that judicial in-
volvement in plea discussions would increase the strain on judicial re-
sources at the front end of criminal trials. One study reveals, however, 
that such involvement has the capacity to greatly decrease the strain on 
judicial resources at the back end of criminal trials based on defendants 
being less likely to appeal guilty pleas or imposed sentences.422 
Conclusion 
 In 1977, in United States v. Herman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit concluded: 
The legal battleground has . . . shifted from the propriety of 
plea bargaining to how best to implement and oversee the 
process. Plea bargaining is a tool of conciliation. It must not be 
a chisel of deceit or a hammered purchase and sale. The end 
result must come as an open covenant, openly arrived at with 
judicial oversight. A legal plea bargain is made in the sunshine 
before the penal bars darken. Accordingly, we must examine 
plea bargains under the doctrine of caveat prosecutor.423 
 Nevertheless, the vast majority of courts have rejected the caveat 
prosecutor approach and replaced it with a caveat accused approach, un-
der which the burden is placed on the defendant to prove that his 
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statements were made during plea discussions. Indeed, caveat accused 
now permeates all aspects of the plea bargaining process, with defen-
dants often being (1) forced to waive their rights to reach the plea-
bargaining table or a plea agreement, (2) represented by experience- 
and resource-strapped public defenders, and (3) afforded toothless 
judicial review of the validity of their guilty pleas. Because prosecutors 
frequently overcharge criminal defendants and make high initial plea 
offers, the anchoring effect strongly suggests that the vast majority of 
defendants also accede to unfair plea bargains based upon a cognitive 
bias. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1) prohibits judges 
from participating in plea discussions, and most states have followed 
suit; however, “a growing minority of states allow and even encourage 
judges to participate in plea negotiations.” 
 More states would be wise to follow the lead of these early adopters 
because a judge’s participation in plea discussions has the ability to 
eliminate or at least reduce the anchoring effect. After hearing the sen-
tencing demands of both sides, the judge can communicate the ex-
pected post-plea sentence, which would replace the prosecutor’s open-
ing offer as the anchor and produce fairer final pleas. Judicial 
participation also has the ability to cure many of the other ills that in-
fect the plea-bargaining process. Best of all, these benefits inure to both 
the defense and the prosecution. 
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